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DISEASE-BRANDING AND DRUG-MONGERING:  
COULD PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY PROMOTIONAL 
PRACTICES RESULT IN TORT LIABILITY? 
Jason S. Cetel 

 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a forty-five-year-old woman who has been happily married 
for fifteen years presenting to her physician with complaints of infrequent 
sexual thoughts and fantasies.
1
  After a history and physical examination, 
the physician diagnoses her as having low sexual desire.
2
  But does she 
have an actual disease?  A few decades ago, this woman would not have 
had a recognizable disease, and there was no official diagnosis.
3
  Today, 
she could be diagnosed with some form of Female Sexual Dysfunction 
(FSD)
4
 or Hypoactive Sexual Desire Disorder (HSDD).
5
  The evolution of 
these symptoms into a recognizable disease occurred through a process of 
 
  J.D. Candidate, May 2012, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2009, Vassar 
College.  Thanks to my advisors Professors Jordan Paradise and Kate Greenwood, my 
comment editor Marissa Litwin, and Amanda Brill for their constructive comments, invalu-
able advice, and support. 
 1 See Rosemary Basson, Sexual Desire and Arousal Disorders in Women, 354 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1497, 1497 (2006). 
 2 Id. 
 3 See Sexual Dysfunction—Sexual Desire Disorders, Sexual Arousal Disorders, Or-
gasm Disorders, Sexual Pain Disorders, Sex Therapy, JRANK: MARRIAGE AND FAM. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://family.jrank.org/pages/1508/Sexual-Dysfunction.html (last visited 
Feb. 4, 2012) (“Psychosexual disorders were listed for the first time in 1980 in the third edi-
tion of the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-III), a handbook used by almost all mental health professionals.”).  Com-
pare AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS (2d ed., 1968), and AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL 
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed., 1980), with AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N., DIAGNOSTIC 
AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 293 (3d rev. ed., 1987) (containing Hy-
poactive Sexual Desire Disorder, Diagnostic Code 302.71), and AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N., 
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 541 (4th ed., text rev., 2000) 
[hereinafter DSM-IV-TR, 2000] (same).   
 4 Ray Moynihan, The Marketing of a Disease: Female Sexual Dysfunction, 330 BRIT. 
MED. J. 192, 192 (2005), 
available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC545000/pdf/ 
bmj33000192.pdf. 
 5 Id.; see also DSM-IV-TR, 2000, supra note 3, at 541; Basson, supra note 1, at 1498 
tbl.2.  
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social construction and medicalization.  It is called disease-branding, and 
HSDD provides a quintessential example of this practice.
6
 
Disease-branding is the pharmaceutical advertising practice of trans-
forming symptoms into disease-states and coining new clinical names to 
identify them.
7
  This practice legitimizes diseases in the eyes of consumer-
patients as a pretext to push drug treatments on them.
8
  The concept of dis-
ease-branding has gained heightened attention in the media.
9
  In October 
 
 6 See Andrew Moseman, Skeptics of “Female Viagra” Say Drug Co’s Are “Disease 
Branding,” 80BEATS (June 18, 2010, 9:59 AM), 
http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/80beats/2010/06/18/skeptics-of-female-viagra-say-drug-
cos-are-disease-branding/.  The creation of “Metabolic Syndrome” provides another exam-
ple of disease branding:  
Most people may not have heard of metabolic syndrome, but that is likely to 
change. Once known mysteriously as Syndrome X, the condition, a precursor 
to heart disease and type 2 diabetes, is about to be transformed into a house-
hold name by the US pharmaceutical industry and its partners in the medical 
profession. A society dedicated to addressing the condition has been orga-
nized, a journal has been started, and an education campaign launched. Pa-
tients are already being tested for metabolic syndrome. As the trade publica-
tion Pharmaceutical Executive said in its January 2004 issue: “A new disease 
is being born.” 
Howard Wolinsky, Disease Mongering and Drug Marketing: Does the Pharmaceutical In-
dustry Manufacture Diseases as Well as Drugs?, 6 EUR. MOLECULAR BIOLOGY ORG. REP. 
612, 612 (2005) (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted), available at 
http://www.nature.com/embor/journal/v6/n7/pdf/7400476.pdf. 
 7 Ray Moynihan, The Merging of Marketing and Medical Science, ABC NEWS ONLINE 
(Aug. 30, 2010), http://www.abc.net.au/unleashed/stories/s2996546.htm.  See generally 
Anne Landman, Branding Diseases to Sell Cures, PR WATCH BLOG (Oct. 12, 2010, 12:44 
PM), http://www.prwatch.org/node/9529 (“Once people are convinced they have a new 
condition, they will seek treatment on their own, and new drugs will sell themselves.”); 
Vince Parry, Branding Disease, PHARM. EXEC. (Oct. 15, 2007), 
http://pharmexec.findpharma.com/pharmexec/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=465561&pageID=
1&sk=&date=. 
 8 See Wolinsky, supra note 6, at 612. 
 9 See, e.g., Elizabeth Mari, New Buzzword of 2010: “Disease Branding,” BEYOND MY 
TWO CENTS (Oct. 14, 2010), http://www.beyondmytwocents.com/new-buzzword-of-2010-
disease-branding/; Ben Schott, Disease Branding, SCHOTT’S VOCAB (Oct. 18, 2010, 1:30 
PM), http://schott.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/18/disease-branding/. Comedians and pundits 
in the popular media have also observed this phenomenon.  See, e.g., Bill Maher-Anti-
Pharma Rant, YOUTUBE (Sept. 30, 2007), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rHXXTCc-
IVg&feature=related. 
Because you see the government isn’t your nanny, they’re your dealer.  And 
they subsidize illness in America.  They have to; there’s too much money in 
it.  You see, there’s no money in healthy people.  And there’s no money in 
dead people.  The money is in the middle.  People who are alive, sort of.  But 
with one or more chronic conditions that puts them in need of Celebrex, or 
Nasonex, or Valtrex, or Lunesta. . . . [There are emerging epidemics and] a 
long list of ailments, which used to be rare and have now been mainstreamed. 
Id.  Bill Maher is correct that there is money in drug-mongering because treating chronic 
conditions is much more profitable than curing them.  The suggestion that the FDA, howev-
er, as the representative agency of the government, implicitly legitimizes the mainstreaming 
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2010, the New York Times’ resident lexicographer, blogging about the re-
cent coinage of “disease-branding,” defined it as the practice of 
“[h]yping the profile of a medical condition in order to sell its treatment.”
10
  
In its more extreme form, critics have pejoratively characterized disease-
branding as the practice of “trying to convince essentially well people that 
they are sick, or slightly sick people that they are very ill.”
11
  Disease-
branding has even been referred to as “the most insidious of the various 
forms that medical advertising . . . and medical diagnosis can take.”
12
 
When pharmaceutical companies attempt to push drug treatments on 
patients through disease-branding strategies such as direct-to-consumer 
(DTC) advertising, they are engaging in a practice called “drug-
mongering.”
13
  Drug-mongering is inextricably linked to disease-branding: 
it refers to the practice of persuading consumers that they are afflicted with 
the branded disease and thus require the advertised drug treatment.  Bioeth-
icist Professor Dr. Carl Elliot explains this as a two-part process in which 
drug companies sell their drugs by selling the diseases they treat.
14
  Essen-
tially, branding a disease “is to shape its public perception in order to make 
it more palatable to potential patients.”
15
  Once a disease is successfully 
branded, drug companies engage in drug-mongering by persuading con-
sumer-patients that they need to use the company’s drugs to treat the dis-
ease.
16
  The confluence of disease-branding and drug-mongering is the es-
sence of pharmaceutical promotional practices, and these promotional 
practices provide the context and analytical framework for this Comment. 
The development of HSDD demonstrates a disease-branding and 
drug-mongering strategy.
17
  According to Ray Moynihan, an investigative 
 
of ailments through its approval process misconstrues the FDA’s mandate, which is to ap-
prove drugs as safe and effective for their intended use, not to determine what the intended 
use is or should be.  See infra Part II.B. 
 10 Schott, supra note 9.  
 11 Wolinsky, supra note 6, at 612 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 12 Id. 
 13 Although the term “drug-mongering” does not seem to be used in the literature—
“disease-mongering” is the preferred terminology—this Comment uses the concepts of  
“disease-branding” and “drug-mongering” as separate practices that are intimately related, 
are complementary, and act synergistically for pharmaceutical promotional practices to be 
effective. 
 14 Carl Elliott, How to Brand a Disease—and Sell a Cure, CNN.COM (Oct. 11, 2010, 
2:07 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/OPINION/10/11/elliott.branding.disease/ 
index.html?iref=allsearch. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. (“Once a branded disease has achieved a degree of cultural legitimacy, there is no 
need to convince anyone that a drug to treat it is necessary. It will come to him as his own 
idea.”). 
 17 Moseman, supra note 6 (“This is really a classic case of disease branding. . . . The 
messages are aimed at medicalizing normal conditions, and also preying on the insecurity of 
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journalist and vocal opponent of pharmaceutical promotional practices, 
drug companies have diligently tried to convince women that they need a 
drug to treat low libido.
18
  He notes that pharmaceutical companies “have 
helped create the measurement and diagnostic instruments to persuade 
women that their sexual difficulties deserve a medical label and treat-
ment.”
19
 
Flibanserin is a drug that was developed to treat HSDD, and the drug 
sponsor’s briefing document, prepared for the Food and Drug Administra-
tion’s (FDA) Reproductive Health Drugs Advisory Committee
20
 meeting 
regarding flibanserin’s New Drug Application (NDA), reported positive 
safety and efficacy data.
21
  But the FDA’s Advisory Committee unani-
 
both the clinician and the patient.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).  Contra 
Nancy Zielinski, Treatments Needed to Treat Female Sexual Dysfunction Experts Say, 
EXAMINER.COM (Jan. 10, 2011, 11:12 AM), http://www.examiner.com/sexual-health-in-
grand-rapids/treatments-needed-to-treat-female-sexual-dysfunction-experts-
say?cid=parsely#parsely (noting that ninety percent of doctors surveyed accept the need for 
an FDA-approved treatment). 
 18 Kathleen Blanchard, Female Sexual Dysfunction: Are Drug Companies Manufactur-
ing a Disease?, EXAMINER.COM (Oct. 2, 2010, 2:45 PM), http://www.examiner.com/women-
s-health-in-national/female-sexual-dysfunction-are-drug-companies-manufacturing-a-
disease. 
 19 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 20 An advisory committee is composed of outside scientific and medical experts as well 
as industry, consumer, and patient representatives who provide the FDA with independent 
advice on regulatory decisions.  See Questions and Answers Regarding Advisory Committee 
Membership, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/AdvisoryCommittees/ 
AboutAdvisoryCommittees/CommitteeMembership/ucm117646.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 
2012); see also U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR THE PUBLIC AND FDA 
STAFF ON CONVENING ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEETINGS 3 (2008), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM125651. 
pdf (“FDA’s advisory committees provide independent expert advice to the agency on a 
range of complex scientific, technical, and policy issues.  An advisory committee meeting 
also provides a forum for a public hearing on important matters.  Although advisory com-
mittees provide recommendations to FDA, FDA makes the final decisions.”). 
 21 BOEHRINGER INGELHEIM, FLIBANSERIN BRIEFING DOCUMENT 22 (2010), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/Drugs/
ReproductiveHealthDrugsAdvisoryCommittee/UCM215438.pdf.  
Flibanserin therapy, at the recommended dosing regimen . . . resulted in sta-
tistically significant and clinically relevant improvements of the hallmark 
symptoms of HSDD in premenopausal women based on patient-based as-
sessments of sexual desire, sexual distress, sexual activity, sexual function, 
and overall patient benefit.  In general, flibanserin is well-tolerated as the 
AEs reported during the development program were non-serious and mild in 
severity.  Currently, women face extremely limited options when seeking 
help for HSDD.  It is important that women suffering from HSDD and their 
health care providers have an approved treatment option available to them. 
As the first pharmacologic therapy for HSDD in premenopausal women, if 
approved, Flibanserin would appreciably expand the HSDD treatment arma-
mentarium and the choices available to women. 
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mously rejected flibanserin,
22
 and the sponsor discontinued seeking ap-
proval before the FDA could take final regulatory action on the NDA.
23
  
Although HSDD has evolved into a recognized disease, its treatment has 
failed to co-evolve—there are currently no FDA-approved pharmaceutical 
options available to treat this condition.
24
  Without a drug to sell, drug 
companies are unable to engage in drug-mongering, but flibanserin still 
remains one of the most recent attempts at disease-branding.
25
  Despite the 
 
Id.; see also Press Release, Boehringer Ingelheim, Women with Hypoactive Sexual Desire 
Disorder (HSDD) Report That Flibanserin Increased Their Sexual Desire and Reduced As-
sociated Distress (May 19, 2010), available at http://www.boehringer-
ingelheim.com/news/news_releases/press_releases/2010/19_may_2010.html.  
 22 Emily P. Walker, Company Halts “Female Viagra” Development, MEDPAGE TODAY 
(Oct. 12, 2010), http://www.medpagetoday.com/ProductAlert/Prescriptions/22697 (“The 
committee also voted 11 to 0 that the company failed to demonstrate that the benefits of 
flibanserin outweigh the risks, which include fainting, accidental injury, insomnia, and fa-
tigue.”); see also Duff Wilson, Drug for Sexual Desire Disorder Opposed by Panel, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 19, 2010, at B3; “Female Viagra” Falls Short, FDA Says, MSNBC.COM (June 
16, 2010, 2:35 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37727629/; David W. Freeman, “Fe-
male Viagra” a Flop, Says FDA Panel, CBS NEWS (June 17, 2010), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/06/17/health/main6591413.shtml. 
 23 Press Release, Boehringer Ingelheim, Following Regulatory Feedback Boehringer 
Ingelheim Decides to Discontinue Flibanserin Development (Oct. 8, 2010), available at 
http://www.boehringer-
ingelheim.com/news/news_releases/press_releases/2010/08_october_2010_fliba.html. 
Boehringer Ingelheim announced today the decision to discontinue the de-
velopment of its investigational compound flibanserin for the treatment of 
Hypoactive Sexual Desire Disorder (HSDD).  The company continues to be-
lieve in the value that flibanserin would have for women suffering with 
HSDD, a significant and recognized medical condition which impacts the 
lives of many women around the world. 
Id.; Boehringer Pulls the Plug on “Pink Viagra,” REUTERS (Oct. 8, 2010, 11:55 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/08/us-boehringer-flibanserin-
idUSTRE6970TN20101008. 
 24 Jennifer Corbett Dooren, FDA Questions Safety of “Female Viagra,” WALL ST. J., 
June 17, 2010, at D2 [hereinafter Dooren, FDA Questions]; Jennifer Corbett Dooren, Panel 
Rejects “Pink Viagra” to Boost Female Libido, WALL ST. J (June 18, 2010, 5:50 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704122904575315140487376022.html; cf. 
Basson, supra note 1, at 1502–03 tbl.4 (noting the absence of FDA-approved medications, 
but the possibility of off-label uses).  In a hypothetical case study of  a woman with low 
sexual desire, Dr. Basson stated that 
[o]n the basis of clinical experience and limited data on outcomes, I would 
recommend a combination of cognitive behavioral therapy and sex therapy . . 
. .  Any apparent interpersonal problems should be addressed before further 
sexual therapy is pursued.  At the present time, I would not recommend any 
pharmacologic therapy, pending the availability of more (and longer-term) 
data in support of such treatment. 
Id. at 1504–05. 
 25 See Moseman, supra note 6; Press Release, BioSante Pharmaceuticals Reports Posi-
tive LibiGel® Safety Data Review for Phase III Program (Feb. 9, 2012), available at 
http://www.biosantepharma.com/News-Releases.php?ID=020912 (describing LibiGel as a 
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lack of an FDA-approved drug to treat HSDD, the controversy surrounding 
the branding of this disease remains.
26
  Annemarie Jutel, a medical sociolo-
gist, suggests that 
[i]n a society which portrays female hypersexuality as desirable, and 
where women’s tumultuous lives don’t usually result in perfectly timed 
and balanced sexual urges, it hasn’t been hard to describe low libido as 
abnormal in order to sell an expensive cure . . . . The problem is the 
hidden commercial interests behind the science . . . .  Sexuality is a 
complex expression of social, cultural, psychological, and physiologi-
cal factors and many of us struggle with it, without being “sick.” Don’t 
let the pharmaceutical industry tell you otherwise.
27
 
Commenting on the controversy surrounding the definition of HSDD, 
Psychiatry Professor Dr. Ronald Pies notes that “in weighing this spectrum 
of divergent views, it’s clear that much turns on our philosophical under-
standing of terms such as ‘disease,’ ‘disorder,’ ‘dysfunction,’ and ‘medical 
condition.’”
28
  The controversy essentially encompasses the cultural, social, 
medical, and (in this Comment) legal significance of disease-branding and 
drug-mongering—their impact on regulatory decision-making, interaction 
with statutory rules, and other potential legal ramifications. 
Disease-branding and drug-mongering are the pharmaceutical promo-
tional practices of “selling sickness” by widening the boundaries of diag-
nosable illnesses in order to expand the market for drug treatments.
29
  They 
are “a process that encourages the conversion of socially created anxiety 
 
drug “in development for the treatment of female sexual dysfunction (FSD), specifically, 
hypoactive sexual desire disorder (HSDD) in menopausal women.”). 
 26 See, e.g., Moynihan, supra note 4; Leonore Tiefer, Female Sexual Dysfunction: A 
Case Study of Disease Mongering and Activist Resistance, 3 PLOS MED. 436, 436 (2006), 
available at http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/ 
info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.0030178; Natasha Singer, Sex and the Single 
Drug, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2010, at BU3; Duff Wilson, Push to Market Pill Stirs Debate on 
Sexual Desire, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2010, at A1; Annemarie Jutel, Why the Cure for Flag-
ging Female Libido is Hard to Swallow, BRISBANE TIMES (Dec. 8, 2009), 
http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/lifestyle/diet-and-fitness/why-the-cure-for-flagging-
female-libido-is-hard-to-swallow-20091207-ketm.html; Ray Moynihan, Sex Drugs for 
Women Don’t Seem to Be Working, ABC NEWS ONLINE (Sept. 1, 2010), 
http://www.abc.net.au/unleashed/stories/s2998870.htm; Susan Seligson, Female Libido Pill 
Leaves Ethicist Cold, BU TODAY ONLINE (June 25, 2010), 
http://www.bu.edu/today/node/11179.  
 27 Jutel, supra note 26. 
 28 Ronald W. Pies, FDA Lacks Desire for Flibanserin—But Does Hypoactive Sexual 
Desire Disorder Even Exist?, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES (Aug. 4, 2010),  
http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/sexual-disorders/content/article/10168/1632801.  For a 
discussion of how the term “disease” is defined, see infra Part III.B. 
 29 Ray Moynihan & David Henry, The Fight Against Disease Mongering: Generating 
Knowledge for Action, 3 PLOS MED. 425, 425 (2006), available at 
http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.0030191. 
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into medical diagnoses suitable for pharmacological treatment.”
30
  Critics 
argue that these promotional practices “turn[] healthy people into patients, 
waste[] precious resources, and cause[] iatrogenic harm.”
31
 
Despite the growing attention to disease-branding and drug-
mongering in the public health, sociology-of-health, economic, and adver-
tising fields, there appears to be a critical abstinence in the legal realm.  
There is a dearth of legal literature addressing these practices as a unique 
phenomenon or evaluating the regulatory issues and liability implications 
for the pharmaceutical industry that stem from them.
32
  This Comment con-
cedes that opposition to the phenomena of disease-branding and drug-
mongering, which critics of the pharmaceutical industry and of the FDA 
have expounded, is valid from a sociology-of-health perspective.  But such 
criticism is inappropriate from a regulatory point of view.  This Comment 
argues that the practices of disease-branding and drug-mongering comply 
with the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FD&C Act”)
33
 and its accompa-
nying regulations addressing prescription drug advertising.
34
  Because this 
Comment concludes that critics are unlikely to succeed in challenging these 
practices from an administrative-law perspective, it will consider the viabil-
ity of a legal cause of action against such practices, using the common law 
torts of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress (NIED), and medical malpractice.  Upon analyz-
ing these litigation strategies, the Comment concludes that a claim for 
IIED, NIED, or medical malpractice could possibly survive a motion to 
dismiss and could be decided on its merits.  Nevertheless, such a claim 
would be unlikely to succeed and, if it did, would ultimately be ineffective 
as a comprehensive reform measure.  Accordingly, the most successful and 
effective route to change these practices on a systemic level is in the legis-
lative arena.  Therefore, this Comment considers a previously introduced 
congressional bill, the Independent Drug Education and Outreach Act 
(IDEA), and proposes and evaluates possible amendments to this bill that 
would address the negative effects of disease-branding and drug-mongering 
 
 30 Tiefer, supra note 26, at 436. 
 31 Moynihan & Henry, supra note 29, at 425.  An iatrogenic injury is one “induced in-
advertently by a physician or surgeon or by medical treatment or diagnostic procedures.” 
Iatrogenic Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S MED. DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/medical/iatrogenic (last visited Mar. 2, 2012).    
 32 See Lars Noah, Pigeonholing Illness: Medical Diagnosis as a Legal Construct, 50 
HASTINGS L.J. 241, 242 (1999) (“Little or no attention is paid to the ways in which medical 
professionals react to the external pressures emanating from, or mediated by, legal institu-
tions with regard to defining and diagnosing disease conditions.”).  A LexisNexis search of 
the “U.S. Law Reviews and Journals, Combined” database reveals zero hits for “drug mon-
gering,” zero hits for “disease branding,” and sixteen hits for “disease mongering” (the ma-
jority of which are simply quoting works by Ray Moynihan).   
 33 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399d (2006). 
 34 See generally 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2011) (prescription drug advertisements). 
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practices.  Through medical education strategies, such as “academic detail-
ing” of physicians, critics can combat what they perceive as pervasive and 
insidious pharmaceutical promotional practices. 
Part II of this Comment examines the historical and legal development 
of the FDA’s regulatory framework as well as the evolution of the federal 
drug approval process and DTC advertising of approved prescription drugs.  
Part III discusses the sociology-of-health analytical framework and consid-
ers how the social construction and medicalization of disease enables dis-
ease-branding and drug-mongering.  Part IV examines potential causes of 
action that critics can use to challenge the pharmaceutical industry in the 
tort arena through claims for IIED, NIED, and medical malpractice.  It then 
considers legislative and educational reform efforts as a prospective reme-
dy to combat the negative effects of disease-branding and drug-mongering.  
Part V concludes. 
II. THE HISTORY OF DRUG REGULATION AND THE CURRENT LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK 
A. Historical Development of the Statutory Definition of a “Drug” 
The development of a regulatory framework for approving drugs be-
gan in 1906,
35
 but the relevant statutory definition of “drug” was first 
amended in 1938.
36
  The legislative history of the FD&C Act reveals the 
evolution of the definition.
37
  During the congressional hearings leading up 
to the 1938 Act, there was growing concern about the lack of jurisdictional 
reach.  The “definition for the term ‘drug’ fail[ed] to cover drugs invented 
to alter the structure or function of the body,”
38
 as opposed to those “sub-
stances intended to be used for the cure, mitigation, or prevention of dis-
ease,”
39
 to which the 1906 Act definition was limited.  The principal way in 
which the 1938 amendments altered the definition of “drug” was that 
“[d]rugs intended for diagnosing illness or for remedying underweight or 
overweight or for otherwise affecting bodily structure or function [were] 
subjected to regulation.”
40
  The 1938 amendments added § 321(g)(3),
41
 
 
 35 See Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, Pub. L. No 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) (re-
pealed 1938). 
 36 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, § 201(g), 52 
Stat. 1040, 1041 (1938) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1) (2006)). 
 37 See generally LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG & COSMETIC ACT 
AND ITS AMENDMENTS (1979) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY FD&C ACT]. 
 38 81 CONG. REC. 1947 (1937) (statement of Rep. Edward H. Rees), reprinted in 5 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY FD&C ACT, supra note 37, at 816, 816.  
 39 § 7, 34 Stat. at 769. 
 40 S. REP. NO. 75-2139, at 2 (1938), reprinted in 6 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FD&C ACT, 
supra note 37, at 300, 301. 
 41 § 201(g), 52 Stat. at 1041 (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C) (2006)). 
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which defined the structure/function drugs to include all products “which 
are sold to correct the function and structure of the body, such as obesity 
preparations which were not covered by the act.”
42
  The purpose of this 
broadened and inclusive definition was “to reach the use of fat reducers, 
particularly since obesity may not be a disease.”
43
 
One should consider the FDA’s regulatory capacity over obesity drugs 
in order to analyze how “structure/function” drugs became subject to FDA 
regulation.  Prior to 1938, obesity drugs were outside the FDA’s jurisdic-
tional scope, but now, especially within the past couple of years, the FDA 
has taken several decisive regulatory actions with respect to obesity drugs.  
On October 8, 2010, Abbott Labs withdrew the diet drug Meridia from the 
market.
44
  A week later, the FDA “declined to approve what would have 
been the first new prescription diet pill in more than a decade.”
45
  Shortly 
thereafter, the FDA rejected another diet pill, called Qnexa.
46
  Dr. Ken Fu-
jioka, Director of the Center for Weight Management at the Scripps Clinic 
in San Diego, commented how “[i]t looks pretty bleak out there for anyone 
trying to get a drug approval for weight loss.”
47
 
 
 42 Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics: Hearings on S. 5 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. 
on Commerce, 74th Cong. 29 (1935) (statement of Charles Wesley Dunn), reprinted in 3 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY FD&C ACT, supra note 37, at 192, 224.  At this hearing, Mr. Dunn 
was representing the Associated Grocery Manufacturers of America, Inc., the American 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, the National Association of Dog Food Manufac-
turers, and himself. 
 43 Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics: Hearings on H.R. 6906, H.R. 8805, H.R. 8941 and S. 5 
Before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 74th Cong. 55 
(1935) (statement of Walter G. Campbell, Chief, Food and Drug Administration) [hereinaf-
ter Food, Drug, and Cosmetics], reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY FD&C ACT, supra 
note 37, at 312, 370;  cf. Annemarie Jutel, Sociology of Diagnosis, A Preliminary Review, 31 
SOC. HEALTH & ILLNESS 278, 292 (2009) (“Commercial interests have an important stake in 
highlighting overweight as a medical diagnosis, rather than a statistical deviation from nor-
mative weight.”). 
 44 Andrew Pollack, Abbott Labs Withdraws Meridia From the Market, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
9, 2010, at B3.  
 45 Andrew Pollack, No F.D.A. Approval for New Diet Pill, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2010, at 
A27; see also Andrew Pollack, F.D.A Panel Urges Denial of Diet Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
17, 2010, at B1.  An FDA advisory panel  
recommended against approval of a new diet pill, the latest setback in efforts 
to develop treatments for the nation’s obesity epidemic . . . .  The negative 
vote is the second setback this year in attempts to win approval for what 
would be the first new prescription weight-loss drug in more than a decade. 
Id. 
 46 Andrew Pollack, F.D.A. Rejects Qnexa, a Third Weight-Loss Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
29, 2010, at A1.   
 47 Id.  But see Andrew Pollack, Advisory Panel Favors Approval for Weight-Loss Drug, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2012, at B1 (noting that the advisory committee recommended ap-
proval of Qnexa and that the FDA is expected to decide whether to approve the drug by 
April 17, 2012). 
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This observation would have seemed absurd to any drug manufacturer 
prior to the 1938 Act, which expanded the definition of drug to include 
structure/function drugs specifically in order to place obesity drugs within 
its regulatory jurisdiction.
48
  Prior to 1938, obesity was not considered a 
disease and obesity drugs could only be regulated through FDA’s enforce-
ment authority over adulteration and misbranding;
49
 now, because approval 
is required, the FDA has taken regulatory action on three obesity drugs in a 
single month, and obesity is considered not only a disease, but an epidem-
ic.
50
 
A drug is now defined as any article intended to diagnose, cure, miti-
gate, treat, or prevent disease (“disease drug”) or any article intended to af-
fect the structure or function of the body (“structure/function drug”).
51
  The 
addition of structure/function drugs into the regulatory scheme is relevant 
for the discussion of disease-branding because it rebuts the critics’ argu-
ment that the FDA approves drugs to treat non-diseases or industry-
invented ailments.
52
 
B. Regulatory Classification and Approval of a Drug 
Drugs are classified as either “new drugs” or drugs that are “generally 
recognized as safe and effective” (GRASE).
53
  Before a new drug can be 
marketed, the FDA requires approval of an NDA under 21 U.S.C. § 
355(b)(1), of an Abbreviated New Drug Application under 21 U.S.C. § 
355(j), or through the hybrid 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2) process.
54
  GRASE 
drugs can be marketed without these approvals if they comply with an 
 
 48 See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text. 
 49 For a discussion of how the FD&C Act’s definition of drug was amended because 
obesity was not considered a disease, and thus articles intended to remedy obesity escaped 
classification and regulation, see Nutrilab, Inc. v. Schweiker, 713 F.2d 335 (7th Cir. 1983).  
For a suggestion that obesity is not a disease, see Food, Drug, and Cosmetics, supra note 
43, at 370. 
 50 Benjamin Caballero, The Global Epidemic of Obesity: An Overview, 29 
EPIDEMIOLOGIC REV. 1, 1 (2007), available at 
http://epirev.oxfordjournals.org/content/29/1/1.full.pdf. 
 51 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(B)–(C) (2006) (“[A drug includes] articles intended for use in 
the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other animals; 
and articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of 
man or other animals . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 52 See infra Part II.B (discussing that the safety-and-efficacy standard of approval is the 
same for all new drugs). 
 53 § 321(p)(1)(“[New drug is a]ny drug . . . the composition of which is such that such 
drug is not generally recognized, among experts qualified  . . . to evaluate the safety and ef-
fectiveness of drugs, as safe and effective for use under the condition prescribed, recom-
mended, or suggested in the labeling thereof . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 54 Id. § 355(a). 
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over-the-counter (OTC) drug monograph.
55
  Whether drugs are “disease 
drugs” or “structure/function drugs” is largely irrelevant for regulatory pur-
poses because both must be safe and effective for their intended use.
56
  But 
whether the drug’s intended use involves the treatment of certain diseases 
is relevant because “the status of a health condition as a disease potentially 
affects a number of [the FDA’s] regulatory decisions.”
57
  For example, the 
FDA gives accelerated approval for certain fast-track products that are “in-
tended for the treatment of a serious or life-threatening condition,”
58
 priori-
ty review status for new drugs that treat tropical diseases,
59
 and orphan 
drug status, which includes licensing incentives,
60
 to products intended for 
the treatment of rare diseases.
61
  Outside of these specific provisions, how-
ever, classifying drugs into disease drugs or structure/function drugs is 
largely irrelevant because the regulatory approval process is the same.  Alt-
hough the concept of “disease” has important applications in federal drug 
regulation, it is only relevant to the initial approval.
62
  The FDA’s regula-
tion of the subsequent advertising and promotional practices does not con-
sider, nor do the agency’s regulators monitor, the status of the disease, as 
long as the advertisement is not misleading and the drug remains safe and 
effective for its intended use, whatever that use may be.
63
 
The FDA’s decision to approve a new drug “entail[s] a risk-benefit 
calculation, so the perceived importance of the therapeutic benefit naturally 
will influence the Agency’s licensing judgments.”
64
  Although this observa-
tion may be important for the initial approval process, once the drug is ap-
 
 55 21 C.F.R. § 330.1 (2011) (“[An OTC drug] is generally recognized as safe and effec-
tive and is not misbranded if it meets . . . each of the conditions contained in any applicable 
monograph.”).  Although there are three routes to market for new drugs, this Comment will 
focus on brand name drugs that require an NDA. 
 56 Compare § 355(a) (safety and efficacy requirement for new drugs), with § 330.10 
(safety-and-efficacy requirement for OTC drugs).  
 57 Noah, supra note 32, at 259. 
 58 21 U.S.C. § 356(a)(1) (2006).  
 59 Id. § 360n. See generally Health Topics—Tropical Diseases, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
http://www.who.int/topics/tropical_diseases/en/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2012) (“Tropical dis-
eases encompass all diseases that occur solely, or principally, in the tropics.  In practice, the 
term is often taken to refer to infectious diseases that thrive in hot, humid conditions . . . .”). 
 60 Id. § 360cc(a)(2) (seven-year exclusive licensing period). 
 61 Id. § 360bb(a)(2).  
 62 Noah, supra note 32, at 242 (“[The concept of disease] helps to inform . . .  risk-
benefit calculations performed by regulatory agencies charged with licensing therapeutic 
products . . . .”). 
 63 See generally 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(1) (2011) (noting that the focus of regulating di-
rect-to-consumer prescription drug advertisements is not on the disease but on ensuring that 
the advertisements “include information relating to the major side effects and contraindica-
tions of the advertised drugs”). 
 64 Noah, supra note 32, at 261. 
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proved and marketed, categorizing products as disease or structure/function 
drugs sets up a false dichotomy because every drug must comply with the 
same laws and regulations.  Approval is based on safety and efficacy, and 
although the risk-calculus might be different for drugs that treat life-
threatening diseases as compared to those drugs that treat less dire lifestyle 
problems, the regulatory approval standard is the same. 
An application for FDA approval to market a new drug requires, in 
part, a summary with a “statement identifying the pharmacologic class of 
the drug and a discussion of the scientific rationale for the drug, its intend-
ed use, and the potential clinical benefits of the drug product.”
65
  Once the 
application is received, the “FDA will approve an application after it de-
termines that the drug meets the statutory standards for safety and effec-
tiveness, manufacturing and controls, [and] labeling.”
66
  Through the ap-
proval of an NDA, the most rigorous procedural mechanism of 
pharmaceutical regulation, the FDA acts as a gatekeeper by determining 
which drugs enter and exit the marketplace.
67
  The FDA uses this gate-
keeping authority to approve a drug company’s NDA and regulate the flow 
of drugs to the market.
68
 
For example, consider Nuedexta, a drug that was recently approved to 
treat pseudobulbar affect (PBA),
69
 a condition “characterized by involun-
tary, sudden, and frequent episodes of laughing and/or crying . . . [which] 
typically occur out of proportion or incongruent to the underlying emotion-
al state.”
70
  Critics of disease-branding may question whether episodes of 
laughing and crying constitute a disease—that is, whether PBA is an indus-
try-invented disease that the drug sponsor created in order to provide the 
FDA with a jurisdictional hook under § 321(g)(1)(B) and thus approve 
Nuedexta as a “disease” drug.  PBA, however, is classified in the Interna-
tional Classification of Diseases as “[o]ther specified nonpsychotic mental 
 
 65 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(c)(2)(ii) (2011); see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2006). 
 66 Id. § 314.105(c); see also § 355(d). 
 67 See Daniel Carpenter, Reputation, Gatekeeping, and the Politics of Post-Marketing 
Drug Regulation, 8 VIRTUAL MENTOR: AM. MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS 403, 404 (2006), availa-
ble at http://virtualmentor.ama-assn.org/2006/06/pdf/pfor1-0606.pdf. 
 68 See Daniel Carpenter, The Political Economy of FDA Drug Review: Processing, Poli-
tics, and Lessons for Policy, 23 HEALTH AFF. 52, 52 (2004), available at 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/23/1/52.full.pdf+html. 
 69 Letter from Russell Katz, Dir., Div. of Neurology Prods., Office of Drug Evaluation 
I, Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, to Randall Kaye, Vice President, Clinical & Med. 
Affairs, Avanir Pharm. (Oct. 29, 2010), available at  
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/appletter/2010/021879s000ltr.pdf . 
 70 NUEDEXTA, FULL PRESCRIBING INFORMATION 3 (2010) [hereinafter, NUEDEXTA], 
available at http://www.nuedexta.com/NUEDEXTA_Full_Prescribing_Information-1.pdf.  
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disorders following organic brain damage.”
71
  In other words, PBA accom-
panies serious disease states, such as amyotrophic lateral sclerosis or multi-
ple sclerosis,
72
 and Nuedexta treats specific functions of the body, the ab-
normality of which constitutes symptoms of these diseases.
73
  Thus, alt-
although distinctions between disease drugs and structure/function drugs 
may be nebulous and overlapping, the status of the drug as one intending to 
treat diseases or affect bodily structures/functions is legally irrelevant be-
cause both classifications of drugs require proof of safety and efficacy prior 
to approval.
74
 
C. DTC Advertising 
Once a drug and its labeling are approved,
75
 the drug sponsor can 
promote the drug and legally use DTC advertising as part of a comprehen-
sive marketing and promotional strategy.
76
  The distinct—yet occasionally 
overlapping—regulatory roles of the FDA and the Federal Trade Commis-
sion (FTC) in the marketing and advertising of approved drugs are im-
portant to consider.  Based on the FTC-FDA Memorandum of Understand-
ing,
77
 the FDA has jurisdiction over DTC advertising of prescription 
drugs.
78
  The FDA’s rules and regulations control the industry, and the 
FDA’s Office of Prescription Drug Promotion (OPDP), formerly the Divi-
 
 71 Diseases Tabular List and Index, INT’L CLASSIFICATION OF DISEASES-9-CM, 
http://www.icd9cm.net/ (search “Search Diseases” for “Pseudobulbar affect”; then follow 
“Pseudobulbar affect (PBA) 310.8” hyperlink) (last updated Apr. 9, 2011). 
 72 See NUEDEXTA, supra note 70, at 3. 
 73 Id. 
 74 The same analysis applies to obesity drugs, which affect the structure/function of the 
body, but also treat a disease (assuming that obesity is properly classified as a disease).  
 75 See 21 U.S.C. § 321(m) (2006) (definition of labeling); id. § 355(b)(1)(F) (labeling 
included in NDA).  
 76 See generally 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e) (2011) (describing prescription drug advertise-
ments broadcasted through television). 
 77 FDA-FTC Memorandum of Understanding, 36 Fed. Reg. 18539 (Sept. 16, 1971).  
See generally Thomas B. Leary, The Ongoing Dialogue Between the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration and the Federal Trade Commission, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 209 (2004) (describ-
ing the different roles of the FDA and FTC in regulating drug labeling and advertisements, 
specifically in reference to DTC advertising of prescription drugs). 
 78 FDA-FTC Memorandum of Understanding, 36 Fed, Reg. at 18539 (“The Food and 
Drug Administration has primary responsibility with respect to the regulation of the truth or 
falsity of prescription drug advertising.” (emphasis added)).  A drug is classified as a pre-
scription (Rx) drug if “because of its toxicity or other potentiality for harmful effect, or the 
method of its use, or the collateral measures necessary to its use, is not safe for use except 
under the supervision of a practitioner licensed by law to administer such drug.”  21 U.S.C. 
§ 353(b)(1)(A) (2006). 
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sion of Drug Marketing, Advertising and Communications, enforces the 
laws.
79
 
A prescription drug DTC advertisement must present a fair balance 
between risks and benefits
80
 and will be deemed misbranded unless it con-
tains a “major statement” describing side effects and contraindications.
81
  
In addition, sponsors of DTC broadcast advertisements are required to pre-
sent a brief summary of the necessary side effects and contraindications or, 
alternatively, may make an “adequate provision . . . for dissemination of 
the approved . . . labeling in connection with the broadcast presentation.”
82
  
In order to understand how these regulations govern disease-branding 
and drug-mongering one must examine the FDA’s current interpretation of 
rules governing DTC broadcast advertising.  In August 1999, the FDA is-
sued a final guidance entitled Guidance for Industry: Consumer-Directed 
Broadcast Advertisements (“Guidance”), which broadened the scope of 
permissible DTC advertising of pharmaceutical products to consumers.
83
  
In the Guidance, the FDA expanded the scope of acceptable advertising 
practices by allowing for an alternative method of complying with the brief 
 
 79 The Office of Prescription Drug Promotion (OPDP), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDE
R/ucm090142.htm (last updated Jan. 5, 2012). 
 80 Drug Advertising: A Glossary of Terms, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/PrescriptionDrugAdvertising/ucm
072025.htm# (last visited Jan. 20, 2012) [hereinafter Drug Advertising: A Glossary of 
Terms] (“[Product-claim ads must] give a ‘fair balance’ of information about drug risks as 
compared with information about drug benefits.  This means that the content and presenta-
tion of a drug’s most important risks must be reasonably similar to the content and presenta-
tion of its benefits.”). 
 81 See 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (2006).  
In the case of an advertisement for a drug subject to section 503(b)(1) [pre-
scription drug status] presented directly to consumers in television or radio 
format and stating the name of the drug and its conditions of use, the major 
statement relating to side effects and contraindications shall be presented in a 
clear, conspicuous, and neutral matter. 
 Id.; see also Drug Advertising: A Glossary of Terms, supra note 80 (defining “major state-
ment”). 
 82 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(1) (2011). 
Advertisements broadcast through media such as radio, television, or tele-
phone communications systems shall include information relating to the ma-
jor side effects and contraindications of the advertised drugs in the audio or 
audio and visual parts of the presentation and unless adequate provision is 
made for dissemination of the approved or permitted package labeling in 
connection with the broadcast presentation shall contain a brief summary of 
all necessary information related to side effects and contraindications. 
Id. 
 83 See U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY—CONSUMER-DIRECTED 
BROADCAST ADVERTISEMENTS (1999), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidanc
es/ucm070065.pdf.  
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summary requirement in 21 C.F.R. § 201(e)(1).
84
  The FDA concluded that 
the major statement of side effects, coupled with the adequate provision for 
disseminating approved labeling, “can provide the information disclosure 
required for [DTC] broadcast advertisements.”
85
 
The Guidance explains different approaches that satisfy the adequate-
provision requirement.
86
  These approaches include telling patients that 
physicians can provide more information, disclosing a website that pro-
vides access to the package labeling, and explaining the location of a con-
current print advertisement appearing in a publication.
87
  Applying OPDP 
rules and regulations to DTC advertising suggests that the drugs are not 
misbranded in violation of the FD&C Act because the advertisements con-
tain a major statement with adequate provisions; therefore, the disease-
branding and drug-mongering promotional strategies are fully compliant 
with the FD&C Act. 
For example, a Zelnorm DTC advertisement contains the following 
major statement: “You should not take Zelnorm if you have a history of di-
arrhea, kidney, liver, or gall bladder disease, intestinal blockage or adhe-
sions.  Tell your doctor if you get diarrhea or cramping, worsening of ab-
dominal pain, dizziness, or headache.”
88
  The adequate provision is the 
statement on the bottom of the screen: “See our ad in SHAPE magazine.”
89
  
A Toviaz DTC advertisement contains the following major statement: “If 
you have certain stomach problems or glaucoma or cannot empty your 
bladder you should not take Toviaz.  Toviaz can cause blurred vision and 
drowsiness so use caution when driving or doing unsafe tasks.  The most 
common side effects are dry mouth and constipation.”
90
  The adequate pro-
vision states: “See our ad in Cooking Light.”
91
  In addition, a Latisse adver-
tisement includes the following: 
If you are using prescription products for lowering eye pressure . . . on-
ly use Latisse under close doctor care.  May cause eyelid skin darken-
ing which may be reversible and there is potential for increased brown 
 
 84 Bernard J. Garbutt III & Melinda E. Hofmann, Recent Developments in Pharmaceuti-
cal Products Liability Law: Failure to Warn, the Learned Intermediary Defense, and Other 
Issues in the New Millennium, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 269, 274 (2003). 
 85 U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., supra note 83, at 3. 
 86 Id. at 2–3. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Zelnorm TV Ad (2003), YOUTUBE (Aug. 8, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=81IVMc5EfN0&feature=related [hereinafter Zelnorm TV Ad (2003)].   
 89 Id. 
 90 CR AdWatch: Toviaz, CONSUMER REP., http://bcove.me/3232jaew (last visited Feb. 4, 
2012) [hereinafter CR AdWatch: Toviaz]. 
 91 Id. 
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iris pigmentation which is likely permanent . . . . Common side effects 
include itchy eyes and eye redness.
92
 
The adequate provision includes a website, a telephone number, and the 
following statement at the bottom of the screen: “See our ad in Allure mag-
azine.”
93
 
This is not to say that all DTC broadcast advertising is legal per se.  
There are countless examples (beginning with the first ever DTC adver-
tisement) of the FDA taking regulatory actions against pharmaceutical 
companies because of false and misleading promotional materials.
94
  In ad-
dition, the FDA has required corrective action for DTC broadcast adver-
tisements that violate the balance requirement, for example, when an adver-
tisement overstates benefits, expands intended uses, or minimizes side 
effects.
95
  Nevertheless, individual instances of misleading advertisements 
represent mere isolated tactical mistakes by drug companies because dis-
ease-branding and drug-mongering, as a holistic, comprehensive promo-
tional strategy, are legal from a regulatory perspective. 
Furthermore, the focus on the major statement to achieve compliance 
only applies to product-claim ads.
96
  Reminder ads, which call attention to a 
 
 92 Latisse Brooke Shields Commercial, YOUTUBE (July 15, 2009), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VqRyv8abWR4 [hereinafter Latisse Brooke Shields 
Commercial]. 
 93 Id. 
 94 See, e.g.,  Letter from Tracy L. Acker, Regulatory Review Officer, Div. of Drug 
Mktg., Adver., and Commc’n, Food and Drug Admin., to Sam Boddapati, Dir., Regulatory 
Affairs, SuperGen, Inc. (Jan. 6, 1997), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Enforce
mentActivities-
byFDA/WarningLettersandNoticeofViolationLetterstoPharmaceuticalCompanies/UCM1691
85.pdf. 
 95 See, e.g., Yaz FDA Required “Clear Up,” YOUTUBE (Feb. 26, 2009), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EO-G8O0lHq0 (Bayer’s corrective advertisement for 
Yaz made pursuant to the Warning Letter from Thomas Abrams, Dir., Div. of Drug Mktg., 
Adver., & Commc’n, to Reinhard Franzen, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Bayer 
HealthCare Pharm., Inc. 1 (Oct. 3, 2008), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Enforce
mentActivities-
byFDA/WarningLettersandNoticeofViolationLetterstoPharmaceuticalCompanies/ucm05399
3.pdf (“The TV Ads are misleading because they broaden the drug’s indication, overstate 
the efficacy of YAZ, and minimize serious risks associated with the use of the drug.”)). 
 96 See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(1)(2011); Basics of Drug Ads, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/PrescriptionDrugAdvertising/ucm
072077.htm (last updated June 24, 2009)  [hereinafter Basics of Drug Ads].  See generally 
Prescription Drug Advertising, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/PrescriptionDrugAdvertising/defa
ult.htm (last updated May 26, 2011) (presenting examples of the different types of prescrip-
tion drug advertisements). 
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brand name drug but do not include indicated uses,
97
 and help-seeking ads 
or disease-awareness ads, which describe a disease but do not recommend a 
specific drug,
98
 are exempt from the provisions that require a major state-
ment about side effects.
99
  These types of ads are relevant for this Com-
ment’s later discussion about how DTC advertising enables disease-
branding.
100
 
III. THE MEDICALIZATION AND SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF DISEASE 
 The phenomena of disease medicalization and the social construc-
tion of disease provide the background and theoretical framework for ana-
lyzing disease-branding and drug-mongering strategies.
101
  This framework 
provides a better understanding of the disease-branding and drug-
mongering strategies that the pharmaceutical industry employs because 
once a company defines the disease—and treatment of the disease in terms 
of the drug’s intended use—the drug can be legally marketed in the form of 
DTC advertising.
102
  Accordingly, a crucial initial inquiry is what is the 
definition of disease for the purpose of DTC advertising? 
A. Defining Disease 
One medical dictionary defines “disease” as “any deviation from or 
interruption of the normal structure or function of any part, organ, or sys-
tem (or combination thereof) of the body that is manifested by a character-
istic set of symptoms and signs and whose etiology, pathology, and prog-
nosis may be known or unknown.”
103
  A legal dictionary defines “disease” 
as “a deviation from the healthy and normal functioning of the body.”
104
  
But, “it may be absurd to decide on a concept of disease . . . [because] 
[t]here will always be ‘normal’ people who will want treatment and ‘sick’ 
people who will refuse it.”
105
  Ultimately, the concept of disease appears to 
be malleable
106
 and the definition can change through social forces and 
 
 97 § 202.1(e)(2)(i). 
 98 Basics of Drug Ads, supra note 96. 
 99 See id.; § 202.1(e)(2)(i). 
 100 See infra Part IV.B.1.c (illustrating the strategies used by various DTC drug adver-
tisements). 
 101 See infra Part III.B. 
 102 See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text. 
 103 Noah, supra note 32, at 244 (quoting DORLAND’S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 
481 (27th ed. 1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 104 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 535 (9th ed. 2009). 
 105 P.R. Shankar & P. Subish, Disease Mongering, 48 SING. MED. J. 275, 277 (2007). 
 106 Noah, supra note 32, at 243 (“[S]cholars and physicians alike have recognized that 
diseases are socially constructed and mutable.”). 
660 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:643 
 
marketing campaigns.
107
  That the definition is imprecise has been con-
firmed through empirical study: 
In 1979, a study conducted by a group of Canadian researchers sought a 
unifying definition of “disease” by asking doctors to classify 34 differ-
ent conditions as diseases or non-diseases. . . .  The study concluded 
with the observation  . . . [that] “there is no general agreement on the 
definition of ‘a disease.’”
108
 
This Comment uses “disease” to refer to the term that the FDA inter-
prets in the FD&C Act, but explains that its medico-legal definition is am-
biguous and thus susceptible to exploitation by pharmaceutical marketing.  
Using the sociology-of-health framework, this Comment exposes, explains, 
and clarifies the medico-legal implications of defining drugs and disease, 
without reshaping the contours of the FD&C Act definition.  That the dis-
ease concept is malleable is significant, not necessarily from a regulatory-
approval perspective, but for the purposes of DTC advertising.  Because 
there is no precise definition, drug companies have capitalized on this am-
biguity to create diseases for marketing and promotional purposes.
109
  Re-
vealing this malleability clarifies the FDA’s purpose in this area—
regulating the safety and efficacy of drugs, not the authenticity of diseas-
es—and provides a framework for analyzing DTC promotional practices 
based on intended use. 
B. The Medicalization of Disease 
Medicalization is the process “through which aspects of life previous-
ly outside the jurisdiction of medicine come to be construed as medical 
problems.”
110
  The sociology-of-health framework of medicalization ex-
plains that medicine is “understood as a social and cultural enterprise as 
well as a medico-scientific one,” such that disease is defined through socio-
cultural forces, rather than clear scientific consensus.
111
  Essentially, dis-
 
 107 See, e,g., infra note 139 and accompanying text (discussing how FSD became 
HSDD).  
 108 Eric J. Gouvin, Drunk Driving and the Alcoholic Offender: A New Approach to an 
Old Problem, 12 AM. J.L. & MED. 99, 104–05 (1986) (quoting E.J.M. Cambell et al., The 
Concept of Disease, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 757, 757 (1979)). 
 109 See, e.g., Marc Kaufman, Hormone Replacement Gets New Scrutiny: Finding of In-
creased Risks Prompts Federal Effort, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 2002, at A1 (“[F]ederal offi-
cials want to explore whether hormone therapies and their producers have encouraged wom-
en to believe menopause is a condition to be treated, rather than an inevitable and natural set 
of changes to be managed.”). 
 110 Adele E. Clarke et al., Biomedicalization: Technoscientific Transformations of 
Health, Illness, and U.S. Biomedicine, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF HEALTH & ILLNESS: CRITICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 442, 442 (Peter Conrad ed., 2005); see also Shankar & Subish, supra note 
105, at 275 (“Medicalisation is the process of turning ordinary life events and its customary 
ups and downs into medical conditions.”).   
 111 Clarke, supra note 110, at 443. 
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ease is a social construction: “In examining the social meaning of illness, 
we focus on the role of social and cultural values that shape the perception 
of a disease or malady.”
112
  The medicalization of disease is the underlying 
theoretical framework through which one can analyze how disease-
branding and drug-mongering occur in practice.  Accordingly, the medical-
ization concept elucidates why and how the definition of disease is mallea-
ble and how it is both outside the scope of the FDA’s jurisdiction and ripe 
for pharmaceutical promotional exploitation. 
The study of medicalization does not belong solely to the sociology-
of-health realm because nosology—the branch of medicine concerned with 
the classification and description of known diseases—has a particular and 
significant application in the law.  One commentator, Professor of Law 
Lars Noah, has noted that “no one has systematically assessed the role that 
the law plays in the diagnostic enterprise . . . [but that] the law and lawyers 
have played a subtle, but often significant, role in ‘framing’ disease.”
113
  
The way that diseases are framed or defined in the socio-cultural milieu 
and later accepted in the mainstream impacts the regulatory status of drugs 
used to treat these diseases as well as how pharmaceutical companies create 
advertising campaigns.
114
 
Sociologists have explained that “recognizing that drugs are concrete 
material objects does not prevent their simultaneous analysis as complex 
social phenomena.”
115
  The “illness identity” concept helps explain how 
this social phenomenon emerges: “[A]n illness identity refers to an under-
standing of self, and affiliation with others, on the basis of shared experi-
ences of symptoms and suffering.”
116
  The illness identity subsequently be-
comes associated with particular pharmaceutical treatments.
117
  For 
example, consider how menopause, which used to be described as “a natu-
 
 112 Peter Conrad, The Social and Cultural Meanings of Illness, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF 
HEALTH & ILLNESS: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 110, at 104, 104. 
 113 Noah, supra note 32, at 252 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 114 See, e.g., Ed Silverman, Disease Mongering? The Selling of Fibromyalgia, 
PHARMALOT BLOG (Jan. 14, 2008, 7:50 AM), http://www.pharmalot.com/2008/01/disease-
mongering-the-selling-of-fibromyalgia/ (describing the case of fibromyalgia). 
 115 David Cohen et al., Medications and the Pharmaceutical Industry, in THE SOCIOLOGY 
OF HEALTH & ILLNESS: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 110, at 275, 278. 
 116 Kristin Barker, Self-Help Literature and the Making of an Illness Identity: The Case 
of Fibromyalgia Syndrome (FMS), in THE SOCIOLOGY OF HEALTH & ILLNESS: CRITICAL 
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 110, at 133, 135. 
 117 See, e.g., “Facing Fibromyalgia, Finding Hope” PSA by the NFA, YOUTUBE (Sept. 
12, 2007), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SMCECMsW1RE&feature=related [hereinaf-
ter Facing Fibromyalgia, Finding Hope] (the public service announcement by the National 
Fibromyalgia Association, co-sponsored by Pfizer, the maker of Lyrica, the first FDA-
approved treatment for fibromyalgia). 
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ral life event for women, became defined as a ‘deficiency disease’ in the 
1960s when medical therapy became readily available to treat it.”
118
 
The concept of disease, and its impact on promoted drug treatments, is 
malleable especially as medicines become “increasingly available for con-
ditions which have so far been regarded as the natural result of ageing or as 
a part of the normal range of human emotions.”
119
  Thus, “although biolog-
ical and clinical factors have set boundaries for which symptoms might 
plausibly be linked in a disease concept, social influences have largely de-
termined which symptom clusters have become diseases.”
120
  The pharma-
ceutical industry and marketing firms have played an important role in per-
petuating this process: “Sadness, or sexual problems, both arguably non-
medical in nature, but variably transformed by the diagnostic labels ‘de-
pression’ and ‘erectile dysfunction’, both of which trigger an army of med-
icalised actions, therapies and processes.”
121
 
Fibromyalgia, or fibromyalgia syndrome (FMS)—”a chronic disorder 
characterized by widespread pain, tenderness, and stiffness of muscles . . . 
that is typically accompanied by fatigue, headache, and sleep disturb-
ances”
122
—is a classic example of the social construction of disease.
123
  
While medical accounts of patients suffering from symptoms associated 
with this illness have existed for hundreds of years, the actual disease “has 
existed as a specific diagnosis only since the mid-1970s.”
124
  FMS is a con-
troversial pain disorder because “there is no commonly accepted medical or 
organic explanation.”
125
  FMS is a “contested illness” because many people 
suffer from it, but physicians “tend to be skeptical about its organic 
origin.”
126
  Some doctors who do not consider FMS a medically diagnosa-
ble disease suggest that “diagnosing the condition actually worsens suffer-
ing by causing patients to obsess over aches that other people simply toler-
 
 118 Conrad, supra note 112, at 105; see also Kaufman, supra note 109 (“[F]ederal offi-
cials want to explore whether hormone therapies and their producers have encouraged wom-
en to believe menopause is a condition to be treated, rather than an inevitable and natural set 
of changes to be managed.”). 
 119 Shankar & Subish, supra note 105, at 276. 
 120 Jutel, supra note 43, at 281 (quoting R. Aronowitz, When Do Symptoms Become a 
Disease?, 134 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 9, pt. 2, 803 (2001)). 
 121 Id. at 285. 
 122 Fibromyalgia Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S MED. DICTIONARY, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/medical/fibromyalgia (last visited Feb. 4, 2012). 
 123 Barker, supra note 116, at 133. 
 124 Id. at 133–34. 
 125 Peter Conrad, The Experience of Illness, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF HEALTH & ILLNESS: 
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 110, at 130, 130. 
 126 Id. 
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ate.”
127
  In fact, Dr. Frederick Wolfe, the lead author of the seminal paper 
that first defined the diagnostic criteria for FMS, is “cynical and discour-
aged about the diagnosis . . . [and] now considers the condition a physical 
response to stress, depression, and economic and social anxiety.”
128
  He ex-
plained that “[s]ome of us in those days thought that we had actually identi-
fied a disease, which this clearly is not . . . .  To make people ill, to give 
them an illness, was the wrong thing.”
129
  The New York Times reported, 
however, that “[d]octors who specialize in treating [FMS] say that the dis-
order is undertreated and that its sufferers have been stigmatized as chronic 
complainers.”
130
  Accordingly, disease-branding reduces the stigma associ-
ated with this condition and helps legitimize it as a medical condition.
131
 
The most prominent reason for the FMS controversy is its “biomedi-
cal invisibility” because there are neither objective indicators nor diagnos-
tic tests for the disease.
132
  Although “the American College of Rheumatol-
ogy established criteria for the classification of FMS in 1990,”
133
 there is 
still no specific and conclusive diagnostic test, so doctors make a diagnosis 
by evaluating subjective symptoms.
134
  Thus, 
the biomedical uncertainty about FMS stands in sharp contrast to the 
subjective experiences of individuals diagnosed with FMS. . . .  The 
outcome of this paradox for many with FMS is that they find them-
selves in an epistemological purgatory in which they question their own 
sanity precisely because of their certainty about the realness of their 
experience in the face of public doubt.
135
 
The “epistemological purgatory” is where pharmaceutical companies 
thrive—and where the FDA is properly absent.  The FDA’s role in disease-
creation is outside the scope of its legislative mandate; the Agency only 
 
 127 Alex Berenson, Drug Approved. Is Disease Real? N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/14/health/14pain.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all.   
 128 Id. 
 129 Id.  
 130 Id.  
 131 The president of the National Fibromyalgia Association proclaimed that “[t]he day 
that the F.D.A. approved a drug and we had a public service announcement, my pain be-
came real to people.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 132 Barker, supra note 116, at 134; see also About Fibromyalgia, NAT’L FIBROMYALGIA 
ASS’N, http://www.fmaware.org/PageServerded3.html?pagename=fibromyalgia (last visited 
Feb. 4, 2012) (“Unlike a disease, which is a medical condition with a specific cause or caus-
es and recognizable signs and symptoms, a syndrome is a collection of signs, symptoms, 
and medical problems that tend to occur together but are not related to a specific, identifia-
ble cause.” (emphasis added)). 
 133 Barker, supra note 116, at 134. 
 134 See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., LIVING WITH FIBROMYALGIA, DRUGS APPROVED TO 
MANAGE PAIN 2 (2008), available at http://www.fda.gov/ 
downloads/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm107805.pdf.  
 135 Barker, supra note 116, at 134. 
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regulates the advertising of drugs, not the authenticity of diseases.  Phar-
maceutical companies exploit this opportunity through their advertising 
power in order to construct knowledge about the existence and reality of 
the disease and promote their newly approved drug treatment.
136
 
Furthermore, the history of flibanserin and FSD/HSDD provides a 
unique illustration of the interrelationship between medicalization and the 
pharmaceutical industry.  Flibanserin’s origin is as an unintended side ef-
fect of a treatment for an unrelated disease.  Essentially, it demonstrates the 
interplay between research, development, and marketing tactics as a drug 
developed for one purpose can be marketed as a treatment for another dis-
ease: 
Studies of [flibanserin] showed it didn’t work well as an antidepressant 
but showed that it didn’t appear to damp sexual desire as some antide-
pressants do.  The FDA said antidepressant studies showed flibanserin 
was superior to placebo and a comparator drug with respect to a ques-
tion about “how strong is your sex drive” on a sexual-experience scale. 
That finding led Boehringer Ingelheim to develop the product as a 
treatment for women with HSDD.
137
 
Another crucial observation concerns how the name of the disease changed 
from FSD to HSDD.  The history of the disease shows that “it was a con-
vergence of pharmaceutical companies, urologists closely associated with 
th[e] industry, and media-savvy sex therapists . . . which resulted in the 
creation and promotion of a diagnosis of ‘female sexual dysfunction.’”
138
  
One scholar noted how “[t]he unnoticed shift in 2004 in FSD identity and 
promotion from female sexual arousal disorder to hypoactive sexual desire 
disorder is another hallmark moment in the FSD story, illustrating how the 
effort to match up some drug with FSD moved freely among symptoms and 
labels.”
139
 
Industry-invented diseases exist and continue to proliferate due to the 
pervasive effect of medicalization.  Medicalizing normal conditions into 
treatable diseases is the undercurrent upon which some prescription drugs 
drift into the marketplace.  Because medicalization is a sociological mech-
 
 136 See infra Part IV.B.1.c (illustrating the promotional strategies used by various DTC 
drug ads).  Interestingly, promotional practices can sometimes precede FDA approval when 
pharmaceutical companies brand diseases and physicians create new diagnostic criteria list-
ing symptoms of the disease that the drug will be able to treat.  See Cohen, supra note 115, 
at 277 (“[P]romotion of a drug by its manufacturers may actually precede the clinical trials . 
. . . The promotion may involve funding professional committees working on the creation of 
a new psychiatric diagnostic category listing specific target symptoms, treatment of which 
the new drug is then expected to improve.”). 
 137 Dooren, FDA Questions, supra note 24. 
 138 Jutel, supra note 43, at 292. 
 139 Tiefer, supra note 26, at 4.   
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anism, it is outside the FDA’s jurisdiction; it is an unregulated yet effective 
instrument within the drug companies’ marketing toolbox. 
C. How Drug Companies Advertise: Explaining the  
Disease-Branding/Drug-Mongering Strategy 
Critics condemn the pharmaceutical industry for its promotional prac-
tices of medicalizing non-disease conditions in order to create new markets 
for drug treatments.
140
  Disease-branding turns “ordinary ailments into 
medical problems, see[s] mild symptoms as serious, treat[s] personal prob-
lems as medical ones, see[s] risks as diseases, and frame[s] prevalence es-
timates to increate potential markets.”
141
  Disease-branding convinces 
healthy people they are sick, while drug-mongering convinces these new-
found patients that they need drugs.
142
 
Havidol is a realistic parody of a disease-branding and drug-
mongering campaign; although fictitious and satirical, it is nevertheless 
representative of the promotional practice.  Australian artist Justine Cooper 
created a DTC advertising campaign to promote the fake drug Havidol to 
treat the farcical disease Dysphoric Social Attention Consumption Deficit 
Anxiety Disorder.
143
  According to its website and prescribing information, 
Havidol is “the only known medication available for this newly recognized 
disorder.”
144
  The public response to the exhibit has been surprising.
145
  The 
exhibit, which includes a mock website and television and print advertise-
ments, is so believable that people think it is an authentic DTC advertising 
campaign.
146
  A review of the exhibit describes Havidol as 
 
 140 E.g., NIKOLAS ROSE, THE POLITICS OF LIFE ITSELF: BIOMEDICINE, POWER, AND 
SUBJECTIVITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 2 (2007) (“Pharmaceutical companies have 
been singled out for particular criticism, accused of selling many new drugs at inflated pric-
es and with false promises, ignoring potentially dangerous side effects, and medicalizing 
nondisease conditions such as baldness or lack of libido to create new markets in the ruth-
less pursuit of shareholder value.” (citations omitted)). 
 141 Shankar & Subish, supra note 105, at 275. 
 142 Id.  
 143 Fake Drug, Fake Illness—and People Believe It!, REUTERS, Feb. 16, 2007, available 
at http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/02/16/us-drug-fake-idUSL165119520070216 [here-
inafter Fake Drug, Fake Illness—and People Believe It!].  
 144 Understanding Havidol, HAVIDOL, http://www.havidol.com/understanding.html (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2012). 
 145 Consumers Fall for Havidol Pharmaceutical Parody that Promotes a Fictitious Anxi-
ety Disorder, NAT. NEWS.COM (Mar. 1, 2007), http://www.naturalnews.com/021660.html 
[hereinafter Consumers Fall for Havidol Parody].  
 146 Fake Drug, Fake Illness—and People Believe It!, supra note 143; see also Marylyn 
Donahue, When Branding is Art, PHARM. EXEC. (Oct. 15, 2007), 
http://pharmexec.findpharma.com/pharmexec/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=465558&sk=&dat
e=&&pageID=1 (discussing the trade magazine Pharmaceutical Executive’s response to the 
Havidol campaign). 
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a frightening approximation of the real thing.  Parody gives way to pos-
sibility as Cooper recreates the entire drug marketing process—from 
the invention of a new disorder (wherein a need is first found and then 
the disorder is penned) to the branding process of naming the drug, its 
pill and logo design, promotional merchandise, and finally its website, 
TV and print advertisements.
147
 
Cooper, commenting on her exhibit and the “comedic” nature of real drug 
advertisements, states: “I couldn’t be outrageously spoofy so I really want-
ed it to be a more subtle kind of parody that draws you in, makes you want 
this thing and then makes you wonder why you want it and maybe where 
you can get it.”
148
  This strategy for a successful parody parallels the actual 
DTC advertising strategy used in pharmaceutical promotional practices.
149
  
Critics of this strategy would reject the arguably comedic nature of these 
commercials because the fact that viewers were persuaded that they have a 
fake disease and need a fake drug treatment demonstrates just how easily 
pharmaceutical companies can succeed in marketing legitimate, albeit con-
troversial, diseases and drugs.
150
 
Dr. Carl Elliot explains that disease-branding works very well in two 
situations: (1) “the shameful condition that can be destigmatized”
151
 and (2) 
“a condition that can be plausibly portrayed as under-diagnosed.”
152
  Dur-
 
 147 Justine Cooper, Havidol, DANEYAL MAHMOOD GALLERY, 
http://daneyalmahmood.com/ArtistsPages/Justine/PastExhibitions/JustineHavidol.html (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2012). 
 148 Fake Drug, Fake Illness—and People Believe It!, supra note 143. 
 149 For a description of various drug DTC advertising strategies, see infra Part IV.B.1.c. 
 150 For a discussion of the “outrageousness” of DTC advertising, see infra Part IV.B.1.b.  
If Havidol were real and provided a safe and effective remedy, then the FDA should ap-
prove it because it is inappropriate paternalism for the FDA to prevent this drug from enter-
ing the market based on the controversy surrounding the existence of the disease.  Doctors 
and patients, in an informative, interactive process, should determine the utility of the drug 
for each patient’s individual needs.  For discussion of Academic Detailing as a way to 
strengthen this interactive process, see supra Part IV.C. 
 151 Elliott, supra note 14.  
For instance, when Pharmacia launched Detrol in the late 1990s, the condi-
tion the drug treated was known to doctors as “urge incontinence.”  Patients 
called it “accidentally peeing in my pants” and were embarrassed to bring it 
up with their physicians.  Pharmacia fixed the problem by rebranding the 
condition as “overactive bladder.” 
Id. 
 152 Id. 
Branding such a condition assures potential patients that they are part of a 
large and credible community of sufferers.  For example, in 1999, the FDA 
approved the antidepressant Paxil for the treatment of “social anxiety disor-
der,” a condition previously known as “shyness.”  In order to convince shy 
people they had social anxiety disorder, GlaxoSmithKline, the maker of Pax-
il, hired a PR firm . . . [to] put together a public awareness campaign called 
“Imagine being allergic to people.”  
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ing the process of DTC advertising, diseases and drugs become “adjec-
tival.”
153
  A psychological connection between disease and drug develops 
when symptoms (e.g., inability to achieve or maintain an erection or high 
cholesterol levels) are medicalized into disease-like states (e.g., erectile 
dysfunction or hyperlipidemia/hypercholesterolemia) because the disease 
becomes synonymous and psychologically associated with the advertised 
drug treatment (e.g., Viagra or Lipitor).
154
  An inextricable link develops 
between the disease and the drug in the minds of consumers when a brand-
ed disease is attached to a brand name drug; it is the essence of pharmaceu-
tical promotional practices. 
Although “consumption of medical and pharmaceutical products is it-
self shaped by brand images and brand loyalty,”
155
 disease-branding is a 
distinct concept from advertising the brand of the drug (i.e., drug-
mongering) because disease-branding creates a brand for the disease itself.  
Used together, however, they create a truly effective pharmaceutical pro-
motional campaign as disease-awareness ads become inextricably linked in 
consumers’ minds with the brand name drug that treats the disease.
156
 
Pharmaceutical marketing aimed at destigmatizing conditions so that 
people feel comfortable seeking help can promote the public health; thus, 
the FDA will allow this form of promotion as long as the drug continues to 
be safe and effective and the drug’s DTC advertising complies with federal 
statutes and regulations.
157
  Nevertheless, although this practice can be pos-
 
Id. 
 153 SUSAN SONTAG, ILLNESS AS METAPHOR AND AIDS AND ITS METAPHORS 58 (1989). 
 154 See generally Tanuja Singh & Donnavieve Smith, Direct-to-Consumer Prescription 
Drug Advertising: A Study of Consumer Attitudes and Behavioral Intentions, 22 J. 
CONSUMER MKTG. 369 (2005) (analyzing consumers’ perceptions of DTC drug advertise-
ments and requests for brand name drugs); Tim Scott et al., Killing Me Softly: Myth in 
Pharmaceutical Advertising, 329 BRIT. MED. J. 1484 (2004) (examining how drug adver-
tisements use visual and linguistic imagery to create associations between diseases and 
products). 
 155 ROSE, supra note 140, at 30. 
 156 See U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: “HELP-SEEKING” 
AND OTHER DISEASE AWARENESS COMMUNICATIONS BY OR ON BEHALF OF DRUG AND DEVICE 
FIRMS 6 (2004), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidanc
es/ucm070068.pdf (“Psychology and marketing research suggests that the greater the per-
ceptual similarity between disease awareness communications and reminder or product 
claim promotions . . . the more likely it is that the separate messages contained in the two 
pieces will be remembered together in memory as one entity.” (citation omitted)). 
 157 Id. at 3.  Disease-awareness communication is not subject to risk-disclosure require-
ments; however, “in other situations where a supposed disease awareness communication is 
determined to, by implication, identify a particular drug . . . the communication can be con-
sidered labeling or advertising and can therefore be subject to regulation by FDA.” Id.  
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itive, it can simultaneously be extremely harmful as it “turns healthy people 
into patients, wastes precious resources, and causes iatrogenic harm.”
158
 
IV. A CASE STUDY OF LEGAL AND LEGISLATIVE REMEDIES FOR 
PHARMACEUTICAL PROMOTIONAL PRACTICES 
A. The FDA’s Role in Defining Disease and Regulating  
Disease-Branding 
The FDA’s mandate, according to the FD&C Act and its accompany-
ing legislative history, is to approve drugs that are safe and effective for 
their intended use.
159
  The role of the FDA vis-á-vis the pharmaceutical in-
dustry is to act as a regulatory gate-keeper by determining which drugs en-
ter the market.
160
  The FDA approves a drug for market if it is safe and ef-
fective for its intended use; therefore, it is an inappropriate expansion of its 
grant of authority for the FDA to consider the legitimacy of diseases.  The 
FDA is an active gate-keeper and regulator of the pharmaceutical industry, 
but not a paternalistic agency or a national scientific arbiter of disease clas-
sification.  The critique that the pharmaceutical industry is economically 
exploiting the public by turning Americans into medical consumers need 
not concern the FDA as this is beyond its legislative mandate.  Thus, while 
disease-branding may be a valid critique of the drug industry, it should not 
implicate the FDA because the Agency regulates neither diseases nor doc-
tors’ treatment of these diseases.  The FDA approves drugs as safe and ef-
fective in order to provide doctors with an arsenal of treatment options; 
doctors ultimately make the treatment decision by determining whether a 
particular patient suffers from a disease and how to best treat that patient.
161
 
The limited scope of the FDA’s role in defining disease depends on a 
multifaceted consideration of its legislative mandate—promoting and pro-
tecting the public health—juxtaposed against the social, political, and med-
ical milieu: what drugs pharmaceutical companies are developing and for 
what conditions, what advisory committees are recommending, and how 
patient advocacy groups are responding.  As mentioned above, the FDA 
does play some role in defining, or legitimizing, diseases because the per-
ception of the disease may shape the regulatory approval process.
162
  A 
drug’s risk-benefit calculus is dependent on the FDA’s perception of the 
 
 158 Moynihan & Henry, supra note 29, at 425. 
 159 See supra Part II.B. 
 160 See Carpenter, supra note 67, at 404. 
 161 See 21 U.S.C. § 396 (2006) (“Nothing in this Act shall be construed to limit or inter-
fere with the authority of a health care practitioner to prescribe or administer any legally 
marketed device to a patient for any condition or disease within a legitimate health care 
practitioner-patient relationship.”). 
 162 See supra Part II.B (discussing accelerated product review and orphan-drug status). 
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disease, the drug’s intended use, and the treatment population.  For exam-
ple, the FDA must consider whether a drug cures cancer, baldness, or shy-
ness and whether these cures have risks, including morbidity and mortality, 
because these factors alter the drug’s respective risk-benefit profiles for ap-
proval purposes.  An effective cure for a deadly cancer with potentially le-
thal side effects has a high efficacy rating, and although the risk of death 
gives the drug a low safety rating, the overall risk-benefit profile weighs in 
favor of approval for a specific patient population because of the drug’s 
positive effect on the cancer’s mortality rate.  By contrast, an effective 
baldness or shyness cure that is associated with a high risk of death may 
have a high efficacy rating, but its overall public health benefit of curing 
these benign conditions cannot outweigh the high risk of death associated 
with the treatment.  Thus the risk is probably so high that the overall risk-
benefit profile weighs in favor of rejection.  In addition, FDA regulators 
(the individuals rather than the institutional entity) are social beings who 
can be influenced by the medicalization of disease-branding.  If they con-
sider the disease more severe than it actually is or are persuaded by disease-
awareness ads and other forms of disease promotion that a normal condi-
tion ought to be treated, they may be more inclined to give less weight to 
adverse events associated with a drug intended to treat the industry-
invented disease in their risk-benefit calculus.
163
 
Regardless of the FDA’s limited purpose in defining diseases for the 
approval process, it has no role in regulating disease-branding strategies 
beyond ensuring that the advertisements are not false or misleading.
164
  
Advertisements can shape the public’s perception of a disease and encour-
age treatment with a drug, while complying fully with the FD&C Act and 
its regulations.
165
  Because these promotional practices do not violate the 
regulatory scheme instituted to prevent the adulteration and misbranding of 
drugs, critics of these practices are left without a viable administrative tool 
to remedy the problems that stem from these practices. 
 
 163 For example, Pfizer’s NDA for Viagra convinced the FDA that erectile dysfunction is 
severe enough and the benefits of Viagra are sufficient to outweigh the risks of the drug.  
See Approval Letter from Robert Temple, Dir., Office of Drug Evaluation, Ctr. for Drug 
Evaluation & Research, to Sandra J. Croak-Brossman, Pfizer Pharms. Prod. Corp. Ltd. 
(Mar. 27, 2010), available at http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/ 
drugsatfda_docs/appletter/1998/20895ltr.pdf.  But see supra notes 22–23 and accompanying 
text (explaining that Boehringer Ingelheim could not convince the Advisory Panel that 
HSDD was sufficiently severe, and that the benefits of flibanserin were great enough, to 
outweigh the drug’s adverse side effects). 
 164 It seems difficult to prove that disease-branding could be considered misleading in 
violation of 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(3) because there is justified medical science supporting the 
legitimacy of the disease, regardless of any surrounding controversy. 
 165 See supra Part II.C (describing how DTC broadcast advertising generally complies 
with the federal regulatory scheme). 
670 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:643 
 
B. Legal Remedies: Possible Causes of Action for Disease-Branding 
and Drug-Mongering 
The determination whether an ailment is a disease is a complex, so-
cially constructed process.
166
  Although it may have implications for FDA 
approval, it should be reiterated that the FDA’s regulatory function in de-
termining what constitutes a drug is purely statutory interpretation and that 
the Agency’s decision to approve a drug for the market is based on its 
evaluation of the safety and efficacy of the drug’s intended use.
167
  Because 
the disease-branding and drug-mongering advertising strategies appear, as a 
general matter, to be legal and in compliance with the FD&C Act, it seems 
that there are no statutory or regulatory bars to this form of pharmaceutical 
promotion.  If labeling and DTC advertising are legal, an argument that 
drug companies are misbranding in violation of the Act will fail. 
Thus, if the FDA does not have jurisdiction in this area because the 
overall strategy complies with federal drug laws and disease-branding by 
Big Pharma continues unabated by regulatory restrictions (provided that the 
advertisements remain compliant), then what is left of the critique of dis-
ease-branding and drug-mongering?  Because the argument that this prac-
tice harms society and public health is still valid from the sociology-of-
health perspective, this Comment considers whether there are any legal 
remedies available for people who suffer injuries as a result of these prac-
tices.  Relying on the sociology-of-health and medicalization frameworks, 
critics can use expert testimony from sociology, consumer-psychology, and 
medical scholarship to provide evidence that the promotional practices are 
tortious.  Consequently, it seems that the critics’ only option to hold phar-
maceutical companies liable for the arguably egregious practices of dis-
ease-branding and drug-mongering would be to file a test case in which a 
plaintiff with standing sues a drug company in tort for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress (IIED) or negligent infliction of emotional distress 
(NIED) or sues his or her doctors for medical malpractice, which, in a cir-
cuitous way, could affect drug companies’ advertising practices. 
It is crucial to note at the outset that the fact that these drugs have 
been approved by the FDA does not exempt drug companies from liabil-
ity.
168
  Because FDA approval does not preempt state-law tort claims for 
drugs approved through the NDA process, compliance with the FD&C Act 
is not necessarily a safe-harbor or a complete defense to tort claims.
169
  Ac-
cordingly, the Supreme Court held in Wyeth v. Levine that brand name drug 
 
 166 For a discussion of the social construction of disease, see supra Part III.B.  
 167 See supra Part II.B (discussing the role of the FDA as a regulatory agency that ap-
proves drugs for market if they are safe and effective for their intended use). 
 168 See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1204 (2009). 
 169 Id. at 1191. 
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companies are amenable to suit under state tort law.
170
  Thus, even if drug 
companies comply with the rules and regulations for DTC advertising, 
plaintiffs will not be preempted from suing them for disease-branding and 
drug-mongering advertising campaigns if these claims fit into state negli-
gence regimes.  The following sections analyze potential claims for IIED, 
NIED, and medical malpractice. 
1. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED) 
Havidol, the brilliant parody of prescription drug advertising,
171
 can 
act as a hypothetical case study for the possibility of an IIED claim.
172
  One 
article commented how the “media exhibit featuring a campaign for a fake 
drug to treat a fictitious illness is causing a stir because some people think 
the illness is real.”
173
  Another article asked, “What happens if you create a 
fake disorder and offer a fake drug to treat it? You get thousands of people 
fooled that they might have an invented disease.”
174
  If an artist can con-
vince ordinary people that they have a purely imaginary disease that could 
be treated with a fictional drug, then surely an otherwise healthy and rea-
sonable person could be convinced that he or she suffers from an industry-
invented disease that can be treated by the pharmaceutical company’s real 
drug bearing an FDA-stamp-of-approval.  Thus, a crucial legal question 
emerges as to whether this conduct is sufficiently outrageous to support a 
cause of action. 
The tort of IIED may provide a viable cause of action that could be 
used to challenge these pharmaceutical promotional practices, and which 
would not be preempted under Wyeth.
175
  IIED is a relatively recent tort,
176
 
 
 170 Id. at 1202 (“In keeping with Congress’ decision not to pre-empt common-law tort 
suits, it appears that the FDA traditionally regarded state law as a complementary form of 
drug regulation.”).  Contra PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011) (holding that 
federal drug regulations applicable to generic drugs preempt state tort claims). 
 171 See supra notes 143–44 and accompanying text. 
 172 Although Future Pharms, Inc., the manufacturer of Havidol, is not amenable to a law-
suit because fictitious defendants cannot be served with process, the evidence that consum-
ers legitimately believe that the invented disease and drug are real reveals consumers’ pro-
pensity to be influenced by pharmaceutical advertising. 
 173 Fake Drug, Fake Illness—and People Believe It!, supra note 143. 
 174 Consumers Fall for Havidol Parody, supra note 145 (emphasis added). 
 175 If the test-case plaintiff has not suffered physical injury, IIED would be the only legal 
recourse because the other negligence-based torts require physical impact or injury.  See in-
fra Part IV.B.2 (discussing NIED). 
 176 Karen Markin, The Truth Hurts: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress as a 
Cause of Action Against the Media, 5 COMM. L. & POL’Y 469, 472 (2000) (citing State Rub-
bish Collectors Ass’n v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 282, 337 (Cal. 1952)) (showing that California 
was the first state to recognize IIED as a cause of action); see also 4 NEIL M. LEVY ET AL., 
CALIFORNIA TORTS § 44.01 (2011) (describing how the first California court to recognize 
IIED as an independent cause of action viewed the tort as protecting the right to be free 
from invasions of “emotional and mental tranquility”). 
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and, although every state recognizes it as an independent cause of action,
177
 
the area of law is unsettled.
178
  Even if courts have yet to recognize an IIED 
claim premised on disease-branding and drug-mongering,
179
 this does not 
mean that such a claim would be precluded, and thus should not deter crit-
ics from exploring the possibility of filing a complaint. 
There is at least one reported case analyzing an IIED claim that is 
premised on a patient watching television, which can be used as a founda-
tion to develop the test case.
180
  In Brinkman v. Shiley, Inc., a patient re-
ceived a heart-valve replacement, and after watching a television program 
discussing incidents of the valve malfunctioning, experienced severe emo-
tional distress.
181
  Although the court held that plaintiff’s emotional distress 
was related to the show’s content and not to the defective device,
182
 this 
situation is clearly distinguishable from the test case.  The fear associated 
with watching a television news show that is not affiliated with a drug 
company and is intended to inform the viewer is different from the fear re-
sulting from watching a drug-company-created and sponsored advertising 
campaign (which, arguably, is intended to induce a sense of fear or “health 
anxiety”
183
 in consumers to persuade viewers to purchase their drugs). 
a. Elements of an IIED Cause of Action 
According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the prima facie case 
for “outrageous conduct causing severe emotional distress” (better known 
as IIED) is satisfied when a plaintiff alleges that a defendant, “by extreme 
and outrageous conduct[,] intentionally or recklessly causes severe emo-
tional distress to another.”
184
  Recovery is possible for “mental distress or 
disturbance . . . even in the absence of physical injury or any other actiona-
ble injury.”
185
 
First, “[t]he element of moral outrage may well be the critical ele-
ment.”
186
  The plaintiff must allege that the defendant’s conduct was ex-
treme, which is satisfied “only if the defendant’s conduct is so outrageous 
 
 177 Markin, supra note 176, at 472 n.17 (collecting cases). 
 178 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. c (1965) (“The law is still in a stage of 
development, and the ultimate limits of this tort are not yet determined.”). 
 179 As of March 2012, no reported cases on LexisNexis contain the phrase “disease 
branding” or “drug mongering.”   
 180 732 F. Supp. 33, 33 (M.D. Pa. 1989). 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. at 35. 
 183 See infra Part IV.B.1.b (discussing hypochondria and health anxiety). 
 184 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965) (emphasis added). 
 185 13 LOUIS R. FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PERSONAL INJURY—ACTIONS, 
DEFENSES, DAMAGES § 55A.02 (2011). 
 186 Id. 
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in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible grounds 
of decency, that it must be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a 
civilized community.”
187
  According to the Restatement, “the recitation of 
the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resent-
ment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’”
188
  Here, 
the role of “applied psychology” is imperative because marketing-
psychology experts can interpret advertising campaigns and give expert tes-
timony about the causal link between disease-branding and drug-
mongering tactics and the resulting emotional distress.
189
  The distress 
could be characterized as the psychological manipulation of an otherwise 
healthy person into believing that he or she has a disease that is treatable 
with drugs, coupled with the iatrogenic harm resulting from this pharma-
ceutical treatment that the patient would not have experienced had the pa-
tient not been convinced that he or she needed the drug.  Moreover, alt-
hough consumers would not be shocked to learn that the drug companies 
advertise to make a profit, they could be shocked to learn that the drug 
companies are inventing diseases and convincing healthy people that they 
are sick; this could very well cross the threshold from persuasive advertis-
ing tactics to outrageous marketing behavior.  Accordingly, the quest for 
profit fails to address or identify the issue; attention in evaluating the ex-
treme or outrageous conduct, which is the necessary element of the cause 
of action, should be focused on the means, not the ends. 
Second, in order for conduct to be considered intentional or reckless, 
the plaintiff must show that the defendant “intended his specific conduct 
and knew or should have known that emotional distress would likely re-
sult.”
190
  It is important to note that 
[a]ctual intent to cause emotional distress is not necessary, because the 
willful wrongdoer is charged with the duty of foreseeing the mental and 
emotional consequences that would naturally flow from his or her con-
duct. If the actor did not undertake the offensive conduct for the pur-
pose of causing the harm received, proof of the intent of the actor to 
 
 187 Id.; see also John J. Kircher, The Four Faces of Tort Law: Liability for Emotional 
Harm, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 789, 799 (2007) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 
cmt. d (1965)).  
 188 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965). 
 189 For example, in United States v. 38 Dozen Bottles, More or Less, Labeled in Part 
Tryptacin, 114 F. Supp. 461 (D. Minn. 1953), the federal district court judge qualified two 
experts in the field of advertising and marketing psychology to testify whether drugs were 
misbranded in violation of the FD&C Act.  The judge explained that the witnesses “present-
ed exhaustive analyses of the content of the advertisement and the effect which it was in-
tended to have upon the prospective purchaser of the drug.”  Id. at 462; accord Applied Psy-
chology in Action: Legal Status of Advertising and Marketing Psychology Experts, 38 J. 
APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 276, 276 (1954) (discussing the same case). 
 190 Womack v. Eldridge, 210 S.E.2d 145, 148 (Va. 1974).  This was the first time when 
the Virginia Supreme Court recognized the cause of action for IIED. 
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cause that harm may nevertheless be implied by evidence of circum-
stances showing that the conduct was of a nature that reasonably should 
have been recognized as likely to cause the harm sustained.
191
 
Finally, the emotional distress “must be reasonably foreseeable and 
justified under the circumstances, attributing to the plaintiff the sensibility 
of a reasonable person,”
192
 unless the defendant knew or took advantage of 
plaintiff’s “peculiar susceptibility to emotional distress.”
193
 
Because several cases rely on this standard to evaluate IIED claims, 
analyzing them is important to understand how they would apply in the test 
case.  In a federal case in Pennsylvania, Michtavi v. United States, the 
plaintiff was a prisoner who alleged that his fellow inmates attempted to 
scam him and, as a result, he suffered from depression, which required 
treatment with the prescription medication Prozac.
194
  Plaintiff’s IIED 
claim, based on the Restatement (Second) of Torts’ definition,
195
 failed be-
cause the court concluded that the plaintiff did not allege any conduct that 
was sufficiently extreme or outrageous.
196
  Michtavi is a clear example of 
the high burden that plaintiffs must meet in order to successfully bring an 
action for IIED. 
In Estate of Duckett v. Cable News Network, LLLP, a federal court 
applying Florida law recognized that conduct involving the use of televi-
sion broadcasts could rise to the level of extreme and outrageous con-
duct.
197
  The court noted, however, that a successful claim for IIED under 
Florida law is extremely rare, as only ten reported cases were found in 
which a judgment was entered for a successful plaintiff and affirmed on 
 
 191 13 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 185, § 55A.02 (emphasis added). 
 192 Id. 
 193 Id. 
 194 No. 4:07-CV-0628, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18926, at *6–8 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 2009), 
aff’d, 345 F. App’x. 727 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 195 Id. at *20 n.7 (“The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not expressly recognized a 
cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, but has consistently held that, 
if this cause of action were recognized, the Restatement would set forth the minimum ele-
ments necessary to state such a claim.”). 
 196 Id. at *22.  But see Chuy v. Phila. Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1979) 
(applying Pennsylvania law and holding that the knowing release of false information that a 
player was suffering from a fatal disease by a professional football team’s doctor could con-
stitute outrageous conduct for the purposes of IIED); Johnson v. Caparelli, 625 A.2d 668 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (holding that a priest’s sexual molestation of an altar boy constituted 
the same, although the claim was ultimately rejected on other grounds); Field v. Phila. Elec. 
Co., 565 A.2d 1170 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (holding that an energy company deliberately 
venting radioactive steam on an employee and concealing the extent of exposure constituted 
the same). 
 197 No. 5:06-cv-44, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88667, at *21–23 (M.D. Fla. July 31, 2008); 
see also Brinkman v. Shiley, Inc., 732 F. Supp. 33, 33 (M.D. Pa. 1989) (discussing an IIED 
claim premised on media broadcasts). 
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appeal.
198
  In other words, “a cause of action for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress is one thing, avoiding summary judgment or prevailing 
at trial is quite another.”
199
  In this case, defendants CNN and Nancy Grace, 
the star and moderator of the Nancy Grace show, recorded a telephone in-
terview with Duckett after her child went missing.
200
  The interview was 
scheduled to be televised the following day, but hours before the show was 
to air, Duckett committed suicide.  After the defendant aired the interview, 
Duckett’s parents began suffering from severe and debilitating emotional 
distress.
201
  The plaintiffs successfully alleged at the pleading stage that the 
decision to air the show following their daughter’s suicide was sufficiently 
extreme and outrageous conduct to state a cause of action for IIED.
202
 
In Lamothe v. Russell, a Connecticut state court denied defendant’s 
motion to strike the complaint for IIED in an employment context when the 
allegation included disparaging remarks about health problems.
203
  Under 
Connecticut law, the court held that sufficiently extreme and outrageous 
conduct had occurred when an employer constantly belittled the plaintiff by 
telling her that she had health problems because she was overweight.
204
  
Analogously, pharmaceutical companies’ advertising campaigns attempt, in 
a way, to belittle healthy consumers by persuading them that they are sick.  
Although the Lamothe court distinguished ordinary comments from those 
made by people in positions of control, this should not be an obstacle for 
the test case plaintiffs because pharmaceutical companies are in a position 
of power as experts in the field of drug promotion and marketing. 
In Elson v. Consolidated Edison, Co., an employer subjected the em-
ployee-plaintiff to eight hours of interrogation, knowing of the employee’s 
underlying psychological condition for which he was receiving treat-
ment.
205
  As a result, he suffered mental anguish, and the court concluded 
that these facts stated a cause of action for IIED because the conduct com-
plained of could be found to be extreme and outrageous.
206
  Although 
pharmaceutical and advertising companies are, or should be, aware of the 
existence of hypochondria in the general population, it would be impossible 
to plead with particularity that a company knew that the specific plaintiff 
 
 198 Estate of Duckett, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88667, at *14. 
 199 Id. 
 200 Id. at *2–3. 
 201 Id. at *21. 
 202 Id. at *22–23. 
 203 No. CV074022729S, 2009 Conn. Super. LEXIS 775, at *15 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 
25, 2009). 
 204 Id. at *4. 
 205 641 N.Y.S.2d 294, 294 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996). 
 206  Id. at 294–95. 
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suffered from hypochondria
207
 and was thus extraordinarily susceptible to 
suffering extreme emotional distress from disease-branding and drug-
mongering.  Therefore, unlike the Elson defendant, pharmaceutical compa-
nies may be able to escape liability because the plaintiff would probably be 
unable to prove that the company was aware of the plaintiff’s particular 
sensitivities and predilection to mental distress.
208
 
Because it is clear that the companies intend to produce a disease-
branding and drug-mongering campaign,
209
 plaintiff can plead the “specific 
conduct” necessary for the intentional or recklessness element.
210
  Although 
the companies know that some consumers would be convinced to seek the 
advertised drug, the plaintiff would have to show that the recognition that 
one might have a newfound disease is tantamount to experiencing emotion-
al distress.  Even though emotional distress can be a consequence of self-
diagnosis that accompanies disease-branding, the plaintiff would need to 
allege that this was the logical consequence of seeing the campaign.  In 
other words, the plaintiff must allege that a drug company intended or 
should have known that emotional distress would likely follow from view-
ing the advertisement, rather than merely showing that learning of a new 
disease would result in the consumer experiencing emotional distress. 
In California, outrageous conduct that is sustained or persistent and 
which affects the plaintiff over an extended period of time is more likely to 
be considered outrageous than conduct which is short-lived.
211
  In addition, 
other cases recognize that individual acts may be insufficient, but the cu-
mulative effect of these acts, when viewed as a pattern or course of con-
duct, could rise to the level of outrageous conduct.
212
  Thus, if one looks at 
disease-branding and drug-mongering as a cumulative advertising cam-
paign, rather than counting each time a consumer views a commercial as a 
discrete event, it is likely to satisfy California’s duration and cumulative-
effect standard for determining whether alleged conduct is outrageous. 
In another Pennsylvania case, Rideout v. Hershey Medical Center, the 
plaintiffs’ child was diagnosed with a brain tumor, which they wanted to 
 
 207 See infra note 226 and accompany text (discussing hypochondria). 
 208 In a class action, however, it might be possible to argue that pharmaceutical compa-
nies and their advertising companies had constructive knowledge of general rates of hypo-
chondria such that the court could infer that the defendant took advantage of the plaintiffs’ 
peculiar susceptibility. 
 209 See, e.g., Landman, supra note 7; Vince Parry, Disease Branding: What Is It, Why it 
Works, and How to Do It—A Win-Win Marketing Strategy that Illuminates, Educates, and 
Promotes at the Same Time, PHARM. EXEC. (Oct. 1, 2007), 
http://pharmexec.findpharma.com/pharmexec/Supplements/BrandingDisease/ArticleStandar
d/Article/detail/465561.  
 210 Womack v. Eldridge, 210 S.E.2d 145, 148 (Va. 1974). 
 211 LEVY ET AL., supra note 176, § 44.01 & n.55. 
 212 Id. § 44.01 & n.56. 
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treat aggressively.
213
  Due to the child’s deteriorating condition and likely 
imminent demise, however, the hospital’s Ethics Committee decided that 
further treatment would be futile and disconnected the child’s ventilator 
without the parents’ presence.
214
  The parents suffered severe emotional 
anguish as a result of hearing over the loudspeaker that the ventilator had 
been disconnected and subsequently witnessing their daughter’s death.
215
  
The hospital argued that the IIED claim failed because the plaintiffs were 
not present when the ventilator was disconnected; however, the court con-
cluded that “aural and contemporaneous perception of the removal of the 
ventilator is sufficient to allege presence.”
216
  Furthermore, the hospital as-
serted that its decision to disconnect the ventilator “was a thoroughly rea-
soned exercise of professional judgment and that accordingly, as a matter 
of law, it did not act outrageously.”
217
  The court held that although the 
hospital’s decision to remove life support may have been reasonable, the 
conduct could still be considered extreme and outrageous to support a 
claim for IIED.
218
 
Analogously, in the test case, a plaintiff who views the advertisement 
on television is “present” in the location where the intentional conduct oc-
curs precisely because he or she perceives aurally and visually the sub-
stance of the commercial.  In addition, just like in Estate of Duckett, the 
plaintiff can witness the advertisements through broadcast media because 
there does not seem to be a limiting principle stating that the conduct must 
be witnessed live.  Moreover, presence is crucial for advertising success; 
the defendant pharmaceutical company is not only aware of but intends the 
plaintiff’s presence in front of the television in order to view the commer-
cial.  In addition, despite the ostensible reasonableness of the drug advertis-
ing campaign for legitimate corporate goals of promoting sales and increas-
ing profits, a court using the Rideout standard could still conclude that 
disease-branding and drug-mongering conduct is extreme and outrageous. 
b. Disease-Branding and Drug-Mongering as “Outrageous 
Conduct” 
In order to establish the first element, the plaintiff must allege that 
disease-branding and drug-mongering constitute outrageous conduct.  The 
question is whether the medicalization of arguably ordinary behavior into 
symptoms characterizing a disease (i.e., disease-branding) and the psycho-
logical manipulation of healthy people to think that they are sick and re-
 
 213 30 Pa. D. & C. 4th 57, 59–60 (C.P. Dauphin 1995). 
 214 Id. at 61–63. 
 215 Id. at 63. 
 216 Id. at 69. 
 217 Id. 
 218 Id. 
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quire pharmaceutical treatment (i.e., drug-mongering) are evidence of out-
rageous conduct.  This section argues that drug-mongering, through DTC 
advertising campaigns, is probative of the outrageous conduct required to 
satisfy a prima facie case for IIED, despite the fact the advertisements oth-
erwise comply with the FD&C Act and accompanying regulations. 
Although there is some research on the relationship between DTC ad-
vertising and consumer perceptions of drugs,
219
 consumer demand,
220
 and 
physician prescribing patterns,
221
 there is no research on the psychological 
effects of emotional distress associated with disease-branding and drug-
mongering.  Nevertheless, this does not mean that the theory is wrong or 
that the alleged conduct is not outrageous; it just requires plaintiffs to over-
come the pleading burden by alleging sufficient facts that state a claim for 
relief that is plausible on its face.
222
 
In addition, at least one scholar has evaluated successful IIED claims 
in the media context.
223
  According to Professor Markin’s article, the ma-
jority of successful claims resulted from outrageous “newsgathering behav-
ior.”
224
  Relevant to the test case, however, are “content” claims where the 
content of the media message is the outrageous conduct.
225
  Although Pro-
 
 219 See Deborah F. Spake & Mathew Joseph, Consumer Opinion and Effectiveness of 
Direct-to-Consumer Advertising, 24 J. CONSUMER MKTG. 283, 283 (2007) (“Limited re-
search has been done on the relationship between consumer perceptions of DTC advertising 
and its impact on consumer requests for pharmaceutical products.”). 
 220 See, e.g., Matthew F. Hollon, Direct-to-Consumer Marketing of Prescription Drugs: 
Creating Consumer Demand, 281 JAMA 382 (1999) (discussing the effect of DTC advertis-
ing on consumer demand for prescription drugs). 
 221 See, e.g., W.M. Zachry et al., Relationship Between Direct-to-Consumer Advertising 
and Physician Diagnosing and Prescribing, 59 AM. J. HEALTH-SYS. PHARMACY 42 (2002) 
(discussing the relationship between DTC advertising and physician diagnoses and prescrip-
tions associated with the advertised products).  
 222 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (explaining the “plausibility” 
standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)). 
 223 See Markin, supra note 176. 
 224 Id. at 479 (discussing Barrett v. Outlet Broad., Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 726 (S.D. Ohio 
1997) (holding that a reasonable jury could conclude that defendant-journalist’s invasion of 
the plaintiff’s home and the broadcasting of images of the mother’s dead body was extreme 
and outrageous conduct)); see also id. at 481 (discussing KOVR-TV v. Superior Court, 37 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 431, 435 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (“[A] jury could find that a television reporter 
who attempts deliberately to manipulate the emotions of young children [by recording an 
interview with the children about their neighbors’ murder-suicide] . . . has engaged in con-
duct ‘so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible 
bounds of decency . . . .’”)). 
 225 Markin, supra note 176, at 484 (discussing Murray v. Scholosser, 574 A.2d 1339, 
1340 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1990) (denying defendant’s motion to strike plaintiff’s complaint of 
IIED when radio host “stated, in reference to the photograph of the named plaintiff, that she 
was ‘too ugly to even rate,’ in light of her physical attractiveness and sexual desirability, 
and that she had won the ‘dog of the week’ prize consisting of a case of Ken-L-Ration and a 
dog collar”); see also id. at 485 (discussing Armstrong v. H&C Commc’ns, Inc., 575 So. 2d 
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fessor Markin’s article does not discuss any case of pharmaceutical adver-
tising, this does not preclude a court from concluding that a disease-
branding and drug-mongering allegation entails sufficiently extreme and 
outrageous conduct for an IIED claim. 
Consider a plaintiff with hypochondria who is subjected to a disease-
branding and drug-mongering advertising campaign.
226
  Hypochondriacs 
believe that ordinary physical symptoms are signs of more serious diseas-
es.
227
  It is a psychosomatic disorder, which means that the etiology of the 
disorder is psychological, but it manifests in physical symptoms.
228
  This 
“health anxiety,” which affects up to twenty percent of the population, is a 
mental illness in which worrying about potentially getting sick, or confus-
ing minor symptoms for an undiagnosed condition, can result in actual 
physical sickness.
229
  The primary symptom of hypochondria is “intense 
fear or anxiety about having a serious disease or health condition,”
230
 and 
this fear can result from “[t]hinking [that one] ha[s] a disease after reading 
or hearing about it.”
231
  Although such people may realize that they are ex-
aggerating their symptoms, it is difficult for them to cope, so they seek doc-
tors and treatment.  Accordingly, pharmaceutical companies take advantage 
of consumers’ propensity for hypochondria by vigorously engaging in dis-
ease-branding and drug-mongering and by preying on their health anxie-
ties. 
 
280, 282 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that an evening news broadcast airing grue-
some close-up footage of a murdered child’s skull constitutes outrageous conduct)). 
 226 Although a hypochondriac may not represent a “reasonable” person, if the defendant-
drug company knew of plaintiff’s particular susceptibility to hypochondria, the company 
could still be liable.  See supra text accompanying note 193.  Although it might be a disposi-
tive defense to prove that the defendant lacked knowledge of a particular plaintiff’s hypo-
chondria, the availability of the defense does not alter the viability of the prima facie case at 
the pleading stage.  Thus, although the case may be resolved in defendant’s favor at the 
summary judgment stage, the complaint could initially survive a motion to dismiss for fail-
ure to state a claim.  See supra text accompanying note 199. 
 227 Hypochondria, MEDLINEPLUS, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/ 
article/001236.htm (last updated Jan. 26, 2012); see also DSM-IV-TR, 2000, supra note 3, 
at 504–07. 
 228 Hypochondria—Definition, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.com/ 
health/hypochondria/DS00841(last updated Nov. 23, 2010). 
 229 See, e.g., Today Show: Tips to Overcome Your Medical Fears, BING VIDEOS (Oct. 10, 
2010), http://www.bing.com/videos/watch/video/tips-to-overcome-your-medical-
fears/6lrdd5r [hereinafter Today Show]. 
 230 Hypochondria—Symptoms, MAYO CLINIC (Nov. 23, 2010), http://www.mayoclinic. 
com/health/hypochondria/DS00841/DSECTION=symptoms [hereinafter Hypochondria—
Symptoms]. 
 231 Id.  
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The symptoms of hypochondria are exacerbated by the media,
232
 so an 
analogy can be drawn to pharmaceutical company’s “disease-awareness” 
ads, which implant the idea that potentially minor symptoms represent a 
major health concern.  The disease-awareness or help-seeking ads are a 
form of disease-branding that “involves using public awareness campaigns 
in the media to encourage people to seek new treatments.”
233
  Accordingly, 
there is a thin line between promoting knowledge of diseases and the drug-
mongering that is associated with branding diseases.
234
  As such, disease-
branding “is the most insidious of the various forms that medical advertis-
ing . . . can take.”
235
 
Moreover, the symptoms that ordinarily accompany experiencing 
stress (e.g., fast heart beat, headache, and gastrointestinal problems)
236
 are 
readily confused with symptoms of very serious diseases such as heart dis-
ease, brain tumor, and stomach cancer.
237
  Accordingly, the advertising 
campaigns that rely on fear mongering to brand diseases—commercials 
that are extremely stress-inducing—can worsen a consumer’s ordinary 
stress levels into a full-blown episode of hypochondria.  The purpose of in-
ducing episodes of hypochondria is to motivate the consumer-patient to 
self-diagnose and seek the prescription drug to treat the advertised disease.  
Thus, a crucial component of disease-branding seems to be the utilization 
of stress to exacerbate hypochondria.  Because DTC advertising exacer-
bates hypochondria, plaintiffs could plausibly allege that drug companies 
capitalize on their particular susceptibility through these promotional strat-
egies. 
The outrageous act does not only encompass the exploitation of hypo-
chondriacs; in some cases, the advertisements can be so extreme that an ob-
jectively reasonable person (that is, somebody without hypochondria) could 
be convinced that he or she suffers from the advertised disease.  For exam-
ple, a reasonable man who experiences rare or occasional sexual problems 
could be persuaded that he suffers from the disease of erectile dysfunction 
 
 232 See id. (“It’s become easier to search out health information on the Internet in recent 
years. Having easy access to information about every possible thing that could be wrong can 
fuel your anxiety.”); see also Today Show, supra note 229. (“[Hypochondria is] certainly 
prevalent and of course it gets worse depending on the news. . . .  [For example,] the skin 
cancer warnings in the summer and the breast cancer warnings all the time.”) 
 233 Shankar & Subish, supra note 105, at 275–76. 
 234 Id. at 277. 
 235 Wolinsky, supra note 6, at 612. 
 236 Stress and Anxiety, TIMES HEALTH GUIDE, http://health.nytimes.com/ 
health/guides/symptoms/stress-and-anxiety/overview.html#Considerations (last updated 
June 16, 2011). 
 237 See Today Show, supra note 229 (“It’s not that [those with health anxiety] don’t have 
physical symptoms, it’s that they misinterpret things.  Like if their heart skips a beat it must 
be heart disease or a routine headache equals brain tumor.”). 
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(ED) and requires pharmacotherapy.  Indeed, Pfizer’s DTC advertising 
campaign for the ED drug Viagra was an attempt to “ensure that the drug 
was seen as legitimate therapy for almost any man.”
238
  Because Viagra 
was never marketed as a niche drug but rather as a treatment for any man 
with subjective perceptions of sexual insecurities, “[t]he perceived preva-
lence of ED needed to be expanded”
239
 in order to broaden the market.
240
  
In this regard, the Viagra website explains that “ED is more common than 
you think.  More than half of men over 40 have some degree of ED.”
241
 
This ambiguous statistic focuses on different degrees of ED—some of 
which could be considered within the normal range—and expands the defi-
nition by medicalizing slight deviations of normal functioning into a “dis-
ease.”
242
  Pfizer’s disease-branding and drug-mongering campaign medical-
ized “rare or transitory failures to achieve or maintain erections”
243
 into 
degrees of ED that could be treated with a prescription for Viagra.  Thus, a 
reasonable man with a relatively normal sex life could be convinced, 
through this DTC broadcasting campaign, that he has a medical condition 
requiring pharmaceutical treatment simply because, for example, his penis 
was “hard enough for penetration but not completely hard.”
244
  The perva-
siveness of Viagra’s promotional campaign coupled with the subjectivity of 
ED symptoms and diagnosis
245
 increase the efficacy of—and intensify the 
problems associated with—disease-branding and drug-mongering, even for 
reasonable, non-hypochondriacs. 
 
 238 Joel Lexchin, Bigger and Better: How Pfizer Redefined Erectile Dysfunction, 3 PLOS 
MED. 429, 429 (2006), available at http://www.plosmedicine.org/ 
article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.0030132 (emphasis added). 
 239 Id.  
 240 See, e.g., Elizabeth Lambdin, Note, A New Disease Born Every Minute: The Market-
ing of Pathology and the Exploitation of Gender-Based Insecurities and Sexuality to Sell 
Drugs, 13 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 145, 153 (2006). 
 241 Common Questions—How Can I Tell if it’s Erectile Dysfunction (ED)?, VIAGRA 
(Aug. 20, 2010), http://www.viagra.com/questions.aspx#/SD_FCP.1.1/2/ (emphasis added). 
 242 Even the Viagra website recognizes that transient episodes of abnormal functioning 
constitute ED.  Erectile Dysfunction Symptoms, VIAGRA (Aug. 20, 2010), 
http://www.viagra.com/about-erectile-dysfunction/erectile-dysfunction-symptoms.aspx 
(“[E]rectile dysfunction symptoms can happen just once in a while.”). 
 243 Lexchin, supra note 238, at 430. 
 244 The Erection Hardness Score, VIAGRA (Aug. 20, 2010), 
http://www.viagra.com/about-erectile-dysfunction/erectile-dysfunction-symptoms/erection-
hardness-score.aspx (“If you’re concerned about your hardness score, ask your doctor if 
VIAGRA can help.”). 
 245 The “ED Test” is Usually Just a Talk, VIAGRA (Aug. 20, 2010), 
http://www.viagra.com/about-erectile-dysfunction/ed-test.aspx (stating that the “ED Test” is 
usually just a conversation with your physician about your symptoms). 
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c. DTC Advertisements: Examples and Analysis 
DTC broadcast advertisements follow a distinct, almost boilerplate 
form, in which a list of vague and common symptoms are described and 
linked to a disease (the disease-branding part of the advertisement), fol-
lowed by the discussion of a prescription drug that will treat this disease 
and a recommendation to talk to your doctor to obtain this drug (the drug-
mongering part of the ad).  There is a plethora of DTC commercials that 
utilize this form. 
Consider, for example, the Requip commercial for Restless Leg Syn-
dome (RLS), which exemplifies this formulaic advertising strategy.
246
  It 
opens with a downward angle shot of a woman; with eerie music sounding 
in the background, she looks up into the camera and says: “[I]t was so frus-
trating, like a mystery I couldn’t solve.”
247
  After listing symptoms of 
“strange sensations” and linking these symptoms to the disease name, the 
commercial transitions aurally—the eerie music changes into an ethereal, 
delicate, and comforting sound as a doctor discusses a treatment option in 
the form of a prescription pharmaceutical. 
The Zelnorm commercial
248
  for Irritable Bowel Syndrome (IBS) is 
also illustrative of the fear-inducement that stems from drug advertising.  
The voiceover begins by asking, “[A]re you one of the millions who feel 
twisted and bloated?”
249
 Immediately, the commercial de-stigmatizes and 
legitimizes the soon-to-be-mentioned disease and then begins to latch onto 
consumer health anxiety by exposing the mystery of the disease: “[I]s your 
body telling you something is wrong, but you’re not sure why?”
250
  The 
commercial then lists symptoms, “abdominal pain or discomfort, bloating 
and constipation,” and suggests that you “see your doctor” because “[y]ou 
may have a medical condition called IBS with constipation.”
251
  Many peo-
ple occasionally suffer from IBS symptoms.
252
  Thus, not only does this 
 
 246 Requip, YOUTUBE (Jan. 5, 2007), http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=PL3G1MngqK4. 
 247 Id.  
 248 Zelnorm TV Ad (2003), supra note 88.  Although Zelnorm was withdrawn from the 
market and Amitiza is currently the only FDA-approved drug to treat IBS, Andrew Pollack, 
Drug for Irritable Bowel Achieves Goals in Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2010, at B6, the 
Zelnorm commercial still represents a typical example of the disease-branding of IBS.  Cf. 
Amitiza Multiple Plus Onstar, YOUTUBE (Apr. 12, 2009), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LsPPwxXVs8w. 
 249 Zelnorm TV Ad (2003), supra note 88. 
 250 Id. 
 251 Id. 
 252 P.D. Higgins & J.F. Johanson, Epidemiology of Constipation in North America: A 
Systematic Review, 99 AM. J. GASTROENTEROLOGY 750 (2004) (“Constipation is very com-
mon, as approximately 63 million people in North America meet the Rome II criteria for 
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commercial brand the disease through a litany of common symptoms, but 
most importantly, it references a prescription drug that treats the disease in 
order to legitimize both the disease and the drug treatment by the full 
weight of an FDA approval. 
Similarly, the Toviaz commercial for overactive bladder (OAB) be-
gins with a voiceover: “Erin wants to get up and go without always worry-
ing about where to go.”
253
  The emphasis on “worrying” appears to link the 
disease symptoms to the stress and anxiety associated with hypochondria.  
One could argue that this is an attempt to exploit potential consumers’ psy-
chological predisposition to hypochondria in order to convince them that 
they have a disease and then inform them of the drug that will treat it.  
Pharmaceutical companies can also take advantage of ordinary people’s 
health anxiety because reasonable consumers (who are not hypochondriacs) 
who watch these commercials and identify with the actors’ experience of 
vague, common, and ordinary symptoms may logically conclude that they 
also have the advertised disease.  The commercial continues, “[I]f you have 
overactive bladder symptoms, today is the day to talk to your doctor and 
ask about prescription Toviaz.”
254
  By strengthening the disease-drug con-
nection, this marketing campaign generated a new market niche of patient-
consumers.
255
  Upon visiting the website, one learns that the primary symp-
tom of OAB, “urgency,” is a medical condition, rather than a normal bodily 
function.  To reinforce this notion, the website purposely emphasizes that 
“[o]veractive bladder (OAB) is a real medical condition [that is] more 
common than you may think,”
256
 in order to convince the skeptical con-
sumer that the urgent need to urinate is a treatable medical condition. 
In addition, the website explains that 
[o]ver 33 million men and women in the United States have OAB. 
That’s 1 in 6 adults. So if you think you may have OAB, you’re not 
alone.  OAB is not necessarily a normal part of aging.  Prevalence in-
 
constipation.”); see also infra note 306 and accompanying text (explaining how FMS and 
IBS may be related). 
 253 CR AdWatch: Toviaz, supra note 90. 
 254 Id. 
 255 See Anne Landman, Branding Diseases to Sell Cures, PR WATCH BLOG (Oct. 12, 
2010, 12:44 PM), http://www.prwatch.org/node/9529 (“By making people think they have a 
new condition called ‘overactive bladder,’ the company created a market of 21 million po-
tential patients.”); John Mack, Overactive Bladder: “Pharmacia Instrumental in Creating 
New Disease” Says Former VP, PHARMA MKTG. BLOG (Apr. 5, 2009, 8:49 AM), 
http://pharmamkting.blogspot.com/2009/04/overactive-bladder-pharmacia.html. 
 256 What Is Overactive Bladder (OAB)?, TOVIAZ, http://www.toviaz.com/overactive-
bladder.aspx (last updated Nov. 10, 2011). 
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creases as you get older.  But the truth is that OAB can affect anyone at 
any age.
257
 
Herein lies the psychological manipulation underlying disease-
branding and drug-mongering: the commercial provides a vague explana-
tion of the symptoms (because everybody sometimes has strong urges to 
urinate), and immediately links it to a disease (thus legitimizing and medi-
calizing the symptoms).  Then its accompanying website reinforces the 
vague symptoms and suggests that the disease is under-diagnosed and can 
affect anyone at any age.  Thus, if you merely think you have OAB, then it 
is entirely likely that you do because one in six adults have it, and if you 
think you experience these symptoms, you should immediately consult 
your physician for pharmaceutical treatment. 
The Latisse commercials provide another depiction of disease-
branding and drug-mongering.  The advertisement begins like a typical 
cosmetic commercial for a new mascara product; however, the ad quickly 
medicalizes “inadequate or not enough lashes” into “hypotrichosis” using a 
combination of loud, upbeat music and stunning close-ups of eyeshadowed 
eyes with full lashes.
258
  Then, Brooke Shields enters the screen asking how 
it is possible to grow lashes; she proclaims, “I’m using Latisse, the first and 
only FDA-approved prescription treatment.”
259
  The advertisement ends 
with Shields saying, “Ask your doctor if Latisse is right for you,”
260
 but 
then suggests to “find a doctor at Latisse.com today.”
261
  One might ques-
tion why one’s regular primary-care physician would not diagnose eyelash 
hypotrichosis or prescribe Latisse.  It seems clear that this statement is an 
example of drug-mongering: instead of discussing the condition or drug 
with one’s primary care physician, the advertisement suggests that the 
drug’s website will allow one to easily find a doctor, presumably affiliated 
with the drug sponsor, who is more likely to prescribe the drug.
262
 
Searching the website for the “Find a Doctor” link reveals the follow-
ing statement: “While any doctor can prescribe LATISSE®, some may be 
more familiar with it than others. When making an appointment, be sure to 
say that you want to find out more about LATISSE®.”
263
  Clearly, the ad-
vertising campaign (including the commercial and the website) is branding 
the disease, promoting not just awareness of the condition but the existence 
 
 257 How Common Is OAB?, TOVIAZ, http://www.toviaz.com/how-common-is-overactive-
bladder.aspx (last updated Nov. 10, 2011).  
 258 Latisse Brooke Shields Commercial, supra note 92. 
 259 Id. 
 260 Id. 
 261 Id. 
 262 Id. 
 263 Find a Doctor, LATISSE, http://www.latisse.com/FindaDoctor.aspx?state=18 (last vis-
ited Feb. 4, 2012). 
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and availability of doctors who will essentially push the drug.  The question 
is whether it is outrageous conduct to convince the viewer that one has in-
adequate eyelashes (especially in relation to the eyelash models’ exquisite-
ly long and lush lashes) and is in need of pharmaceutical treatment.  In an-
other version, the commercial ends with Claire Danes proclaiming that 
Latisse is “from Allergan, a company with sixty years of eye-care exper-
tise.”
264
  This clearly intends to add legitimacy to the product because the 
company’s history of eye-care experience should quell any doubts a con-
sumer might have about the company’s ability to manufacture this product. 
Critics’ analysis of these commercials is fundamentally flawed.  The 
Consumer Report AdWatch analyzes the fine-print of the commercial and 
explains that Latisse is “[f]or inadequate or not enough lashes, also known 
as hypotrichosis.”
265
  The report states, “[I]n order to get FDA approval, a 
drug must be used to diagnose, prevent, treat, or cure a disease.”
266
  As dis-
cussed above, one of the definitions of “drug” in the FD&C Act is an arti-
cle “intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man.”
267
  
Thus, whether hypotrichosis is a disease is irrelevant;
268
 as long as Latisse 
is intended to affect the structure of the eyelash, it is a drug and can be 
FDA-approved if it is safe and effective for this intended use.  Neverthe-
less, this disease-branding strategy utilizes the hypotrichosis terminology in 
order to medicalize what could be considered a normal condition.  Due to 
the fact that the diagnosis is subjective (the meaning of “not enough eye-
lashes” is unclear), patients are more comfortable discussing their feelings 
of inadequacy with their doctors because it seems more real when it is a 
medical condition with an FDA-approved prescription treatment. 
Finally, a fibromyalgia public service announcement, ostensibly spon-
sored by the National Fibromyalgia Association (but co-sponsored by Pfiz-
er, the maker of a fibromyalgia drug), demonstrates the full extent of a dis-
ease-branding and drug-mongering campaign.  Although it appears to be a 
help-seeking ad,
269
 the public service announcement directs the consumer 
to a website sponsored by Pfizer, which contains a link to Pfizer’s Lyrica 
 
 264 Latisse—“When Your Lashes Grow, Your Lashes Show” (feat. Claire Danes), 
YOUTUBE (July 7, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZZ1_CQD1jS8. 
 265 CR AdWatch: Latisse, CONSUMER REPS., http://bcove.me/3cn3q2sx (last visited Feb. 
4, 2011). 
 266 Id. 
 267 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C) (2006). 
 268 Regardless, according to the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-9-CM) Di-
agnosis 374.55, eyelash hypotrichosis is the “condition of having inadequate or not enough 
eyelashes.” AM. OPTOMETRIC ASS’N CLINICAL CARE GRP., BULLETIN NO. 4, 1 (2009), avail-
able at http://www.aoa.org/documents/Latisse-Bulletin-March-18-2009.pdf.  
 269 For a discussion of the types of DTC advertisements, see supra notes 96–98 and ac-
companying text. 
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website.
270
  Thus, this help-seeking ad seems to be a disguised product-
claim ad and seems inextricably linked to a DTC drug advertisement, that 
is, the Lyrica website.
271
  This example is evidence of the scope of Pfizer’s 
disease-branding and drug-mongering campaign for fibroymyalgia and 
Lyrica. 
The public service announcement begins with a quick cut to patients 
in visible distress, with tears streaming down their faces, lamenting the in-
tense and inexplicable pain they experience.
272
  The voiceover begins, 
“[I]magine feeling this kind of pain and nobody knows what it is or be-
lieves you even have it.”
273
  It continues, “This is fibromyalgia, very real 
widespread pain and tenderness that affects millions. . . .  There is hope, 
there is help.  If you’re suffering, talk to your doctor and visit fi-
brohope.org.”
274
  After quickly browsing the website,
275
 one can find a link 
to “Explore a Fibromyalgia Prescription Treatment Option,” which takes 
the consumer to “a product-branded Web site from Pfizer,” referring to 
Lyrica.  Thus, while the commercial and the website are seemingly de-
signed to raise disease awareness, they are inextricably linked to the pre-
scription drug.
276
 
 
 270 Facing Fibromyalgia, Finding Hope, supra note 117.  Lyrica is the first FDA-
approved drug to treat FMS.  FDA News Release, FDA Approves First Drug for Treating 
Fibromyalgia (June 21, 2007), http://www.fda.gov/ 
NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2007/ucm108936.htm.  
 271 It should be noted that    
[w]hen done properly, help-seeking ads are not considered to be drug ads. 
Therefore, [FDA] do[es] not regulate true help-seeking ads, but the FTC does 
regulate them.  If an ad recommends or suggests the use of a specific drug, 
however, it is considered a product claim ad that must comply with FDA 
rules. 
Basics of Drug Ads, supra note 96. 
 272 Facing Fibromyalgia, Finding Hope, supra note 117. 
 273 Id.; see also Berenson, supra note 127. 
Fibromyalgia is a real disease. Or so says Pfizer in a new television advertis-
ing campaign for Lyrica, the first medicine approved to treat the pain condi-
tion, whose very existence is questioned by some doctors. . . .  Many of its 
sufferers are afflicted by other similarly nebulous conditions, like irritable 
bowel syndrome.  
Id. 
 274 Facing Fibromyalgia, Finding Hope, supra note 117. 
 275 Although the link for www.fibrohope.org at the end of the commercial no longer ex-
ists, the first link on a Google search of “fibromyalgia and Pfizer” reveals 
www.fibrocenter.com, which leads to a similar website.  See FIBROCENTER, 
http://www.fibrocenter.com (last visited Feb. 4, 2012). 
 276 It is possible that this promotion is misbranded.  See U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., 
supra note 156, at 6 (“If a disease awareness or help-seeking piece and a reminder adver-
tisement are presented in a manner that causes their messages to be linked together by the 
audience, the failure of the combined communication to include the risk [information] . . . 
would cause the advertised product to be misbranded.”). 
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As demonstrated by these examples, disease-branding and drug-
mongering in the form of DTC advertising intend to make consumers be-
lieve that they suffer from serious medical conditions.  Consequently, there 
seems to be sufficient evidence to conclude that DTC advertising cam-
paigns could constitute outrageous conduct. 
2. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (NIED) 
If the iatrogenic effects from taking the medication are considered,
277
 
then a plaintiff may have a successful argument for the physical impact or 
injury necessary to establish a prima facie case of NIED.
278
  There is no re-
covery in tort for NIED unless the plaintiff falls within a recovery-
permitting category; the relevant one for the test case is emotional harm 
that accompanies a physical impact or injury.
279
  Thus, the law permits a 
plaintiff to recover for emotional distress when the plaintiff sustains a phys-
ical injury that results from a defendant’s negligence.
280
 
In Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co. v. Buckley, the plaintiff ar-
gued that he suffered severe emotional distress from fear of developing 
cancer after he was negligently exposed to excessive amounts of asbes-
tos.
281
  The physical contact with asbestos did not amount to physical im-
pact sufficient for an NIED claim because the plaintiff was asymptomat-
ic.
282
  In addition, the Supreme Court explained that a “‘physical 
impact’ . . . does not include a simple physical contact with a substance that 
might cause a disease at a substantially later time—where that substance, or 
related circumstance, threatens no harm other than that disease-related 
 
 277 Dr. Jutel explains the dangers of iatrogenic effects as follows: 
The expansion of diagnostic categories is not without risk and can have se-
vere iatrogenic results.  The concordant treatment which accompanies a di-
agnosis may expose an individual to undesirable, or unintended, secondary 
effects.  The medicalisation of shyness which results in the diagnoses of So-
cial Phobia, Social Anxiety Disorder and Avoidant Personality Disorder, as 
one example, encourages patients to request, and doctors to recommend, the 
use of pharmaceutical remedies, some of which have led to reports of devas-
tating side effects. 
Jutel, supra note 43, at 286. 
 278 The side effects would be insufficient for a products liability claim, so this cause of 
action is not considered in this Comment.  Moreover, the argument is not related to the 
product itself because the plaintiff would not be alleging a failure to warn, design defect, or 
manufacturing defect.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6 
(1998).   
 279 Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 430 (1997). 
 280 Id. 
 281 Id. at 427.  Although Buckley arose under the Federal Employer’s Liability Act, the 
Court relied on common-law tort principles, see id. at 429, thus making the analysis relevant 
and applicable for our test case.   
 282 Id. at 432. 
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risk.”
283
  Accordingly, the rule gleaned from Buckley is that the mere expo-
sure to deleterious substances or the possible risk of developing a disease 
are insufficient for an NIED claim; rather, some sort of actual physical in-
jury is required. 
In Michtavi, the court noted that under the Federal Tort Claims Act 
(FTCA), a prisoner-plaintiff must suffer “less-than-significant-but-more-
than-de minimis physical injury” before a civil action can be brought for 
mental distress.
284
  The plaintiff did not allege that the prison officials 
physically harmed him; rather, the plaintiff merely alleged that the prison 
officials were negligent in allowing fellow inmates to succeed in their 
schemes to defraud him.
285
  Thus, the court concluded that the FTCA claim 
failed because “the fact that [plaintiff’s] mental condition is treated with 
medication does not mean these emotional problems are physical inju-
ry. . . . [T]he fact that [the plaintiff] physically takes medication, or that the 
medication works on his physical body, does not mean that the medication 
is treating physical injury.”
286
 
Although taking medication for emotional problems does not mean 
that the medication is treating a physical injury, the iatrogenic effects of the 
treatment may result in physical injury.  This distinction is relevant to re-
move the test case from the Michtavi rule.  Thus, although the plaintiff in 
this Comment’s test case is not taking the drug for emotional distress, a 
physical injury may arise as an unintended consequence (side effect) of the 
pharmaceutical treatment.  Accordingly, the physical effect of the drug 
could become, in essence, the physical impact element for the cause of ac-
tion. 
But in Pennsylvania, for example, a plaintiff alleging an NIED claim 
“must suffer immediate and substantial physical harm.”
287
  In the test case, 
this contemporaneous element is missing because the physical impact of 
the side effect occurs after the plaintiff experiences emotional distress upon 
being subjected to the disease-branding and drug-mongering campaign.  
Logically, a second bout of emotional distress could accompany the physi-
cal symptoms of suffering from side effects, but this would remove the 
analysis from the disease-branding and drug-mongering scenario.  Because 
 
 283 Id. at 430. 
 284 Michtavi v. United States, No. 4:07-CV-0628, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18926, at *12 
(M.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 2009), aff’d, 345 F. App’x. 727 (3d Cir. 2009).  Although this case arose 
under the FTCA, the court applied the substantive law of the state where the act occurred.  
Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).  Thus, the discussion of a physical-injury requirement is 
analogous to the test case for NIED because it explains that receiving pharmaceutical treat-
ment for a mental disorder does not establish that the plaintiff has suffered a physical injury.   
 285 Michtavi, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18926, at *14-15.  
 286 Id. at *15. 
 287 Doe v. Phila. Cmty. Health Alts. AIDS Task Force, 745 A.2d 25, 28 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2000). 
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the second bout of emotional distress would be proximately caused by the 
side effects, the claim arising in this case would be an emotional distress 
claim accompanying a products-liability case.
288
  Thus, to correctly isolate 
and define disease-branding and drug-mongering as the causative factors, 
one has to assume that the initial bout of emotional distress was proximate-
ly caused by, and directly preceded by, the advertising campaign.  But if 
this were the case, then the physical injury element necessary for the NIED 
claim could not be satisfied due to lack of contemporaneousness: the emo-
tional distress would have preceded the physical injury, which is caused by 
the drug’s side effects.  Therefore, it seems that an NIED cause of action 
would likely fail. 
Furthermore, the “learned intermediary doctrine” might provide a de-
fense to pharmaceutical company liability.  According to this doctrine, 
which almost every jurisdiction has adopted,
289
 pharmaceutical companies 
have a duty to warn the physician, rather than the consumer as the end user, 
of a prescription drug’s side effects through adequate labeling.
290
  If the 
warning is adequate, then the drug company essentially delegates its duty 
to warn to the physician and shields itself from liability.
291
 
But New Jersey, for example, does not apply the learned intermediary 
doctrine to drug companies when they engage in mass-marketing of drugs 
because the premises on which the doctrine relies are absent in the DTC 
advertising context.
292
  In Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories Inc., the New Jersey 
Supreme Court held that the learned intermediary doctrine will not apply 
when a prescription drug manufacturer uses DTC advertising to market its 
drug;
293
 instead, drug companies have a duty to warn patients directly and 
cannot rely on the prescribing physician’s knowledge and position of au-
thority to convey warnings.  Essentially, the court explained that “[w]hen 
 
 288 See supra note 278 (discussing a product liability claim). 
 289 See Garbutt & Hofmann, supra note 84, at 273.  But see Perez v. Wyeth Labs. Inc., 
734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999) (refusing to shield drug companies from liability based on the 
“learned intermediary doctrine” in the context of mass-marketed drugs through DTC adver-
tising). 
 290 Diane Schmauder Kane, Annotation, Construction and Application of Learned-
Intermediary Doctrine, 57 A.L.R.5th 1 (1998). 
 291 See, e.g., Pustejovsky v. PLIVA, Inc., 623 F.3d 271, 276 (5th Cir. 2010) (“Under the 
doctrine, the manufacturer may rely on the doctor—the learned intermediary—to pass on its 
warnings.  Thus, so long as the drug manufacturer properly warns a prescribing physician of 
the dangerous propensities of its product, the manufacturer is excused from warning each 
patient who receives the drug.”). 
 292 Perez, 734 A.2d at 1255.  
 293 Id. at 1257; see also In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litig., 215 F. Supp. 2d 
795, 811–12 (E.D. Tex. 2002) (analyzing Perez).  See generally Garbutt & Hofmann, supra 
note 84, at 273. (“[DTC advertising] essentially bypasses the ‘intermediary’ . . . .  Thus, the 
role of the physician . . . is greatly diminished and pharmaceutical companies should not be 
able to benefit from the learned intermediary doctrine.”). 
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mass marketing of prescription drugs seeks to influence a patient’s choice 
of a drug, a pharmaceutical manufacturer that makes direct claims to con-
sumers . . . should not be unqualifiedly relieved of a duty to provide proper 
warnings of the dangers or side effects of the product.”
294
 
Although Perez concerns a failure-to-warn claim, the fact that the 
learned intermediary doctrine may not apply to DTC advertising is relevant 
to an NIED claim based on disease-branding and drug-mongering.  In New 
Jersey, the learned intermediary doctrine would probably not apply in a 
claim for NIED premised on disease-branding and drug-mongering; how-
ever, in any other jurisdiction, the doctrine would most likely shield drug 
companies from liability.
295
 
Furthermore, the element of “physical impact” in the NIED context 
raises an interesting and troublesome question as to the proper defendant.  
The drug company’s disease-branding and drug-mongering caused the 
emotional distress and the drug caused the injury, but the company was not 
negligent in providing the plaintiff with the injury-causing drug.  Thus, in 
the test case, it seems that the plaintiff’s emotional distress cannot be at-
tributed to a drug company’s negligent conduct.  The drug company is not 
liable for negligence for the physical injury sustained by the plaintiff be-
cause the plaintiff autonomously purchased and ingested a drug that the 
FDA approved as safe and effective, and the physical injury (side effect) 
occurred afterward.  Thus, the only potential party whose negligent conduct 
caused a physical injury to the plaintiff would be the treating physician.  
Consequently, the plaintiff may have an alternative cause of action for 
medical malpractice for wrongful diagnosis or negligent prescribing prac-
tices. 
3. Medical Malpractice 
A plaintiff alleging medical malpractice premised on a theory of neg-
ligent diagnosis and treatment must establish four elements: duty, breach, 
causation, and damages.
296
  The breach element may be satisfied if the doc-
tor’s “actions demonstrate either a lack of skill or care, or failure to give 
 
 294 Perez, 734 A.2d at 1247.  
 295 New Jersey seems to be the only jurisdiction to recognize a DTC-advertising excep-
tion to the learned intermediary doctrine.  See Beale v. Biomet, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 
1376–77 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (“While the Perez court found that the law should be changing in 
response to changes in marketing strategies by drug manufacturers, New Jersey is the only 
state to have done so.  It is now eight years since Perez was decided, and no other state has 
followed suit.”).  But see Centocor, Inc. v. Hamilton, 310 S.W.3d 476, 508 (Tex. App. 2010) 
(“[T]he theoretical underpinnings of the ‘learned intermediary’ doctrine do not apply when a 
drug manufacturer directly markets to its consumers, the patients.”), review granted (Aug. 
11, 2011). 
 296 See 22 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 185, § 106.02. 
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careful and proper attention to his patient.”
297
  Failure to consider a differ-
ential diagnosis
298
 may violate the standard of care and establish breach, as 
it provides evidence of the physician’s lack of proper attention to the pa-
tient’s case.
299
  This is because 
[a]n incorrect diagnosis of a patient’s condition may produce harmful 
results either by inducing the patient to forgo the proper treatment 
which would have corrected the illness, or by leading the defendant to 
give treatment which is harmful in and of itself, aside from the failure 
to treat the condition with which the plaintiff is actually afflicted.
300
 
In Wojton v. United States, for example, the plaintiff alleged four acts of 
negligence against the Veterans Administration for: (1) wrongful diagnosis 
of schizophrenia, (2) wrongful prescribing of schizophrenia medication, (3) 
failure to diagnose PTSD, and (4) failure to prescribe PTSD medication.
301
  
Although neither the plaintiff nor the court addressed these claims in terms 
of failure to consider a differential diagnosis, the diagnostic criteria for the-
se mental disorders suggest that the inference is clear.
302
  Misdiagnosing 
these two disorders is common due to the subjective experience of halluci-
nations. 
Analogously, because of the subjective diagnostic criteria of FMS and 
IBS, a medical malpractice claim could arise if the physician negligently 
failed to consider the vast array of differential diagnoses for these disor-
ders.  A differential diagnosis is critical when evaluating FMS because 
“[t]here are no tests and no combination of symptoms and signs that signify 
without doubt that a patient has fibromyalgia.”
303
  Thus, “a number of dis-
tinctive disorders may share a few or several signs and symptoms with fi-
 
 297 Heimlicher v. Steele, 615 F. Supp. 2d 884, 910 (N.D. Iowa 2009). 
 298 Differential diagnosis is “[t]he method of distinguishing between two or more diseas-
es having similar symptoms by carefully comparing and evaluating the few dissimilar char-
acteristics and signs, and thus making a final diagnosis.” 2-D ATTORNEYS’ DICTIONARY OF 
MEDICINE D-34474 (2009). 
 299 E.g., Trowbridge v. United States, 703 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1142 (D. Idaho 2010) (hold-
ing that a doctor breached the standard of care in formulating differential diagnoses and 
treatment plans). 
 300 W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Proximate Cause in Malpractice Cases, 13 A.L.R.2d 11 
(2008). 
 301 199 F. Supp. 2d 722, 724 (D. Ohio 2002). 
 302 See DSM-IV-TR, 2000, supra note 3, at 467 (“Flashbacks in Posttraumatic Stress 
Disorder must be distinguished from illusions, hallucinations, and other perceptual disturb-
ances that may occur in Schizophrenia . . . .”); 2 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL. MODERN 
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 9:33 (2011–12) (not-
ing that flashbacks are the “the PTSD symptoms . . . [that] appear to involve a level of reali-
ty distortion comparable to that in schizophrenia”). 
 303 David A. Cramer, Fibroymalgia—Clinical Features and Diagnosis, in 6 ATTORNEYS’ 
TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 25.30, 25.30 (Roscoe N. Gray & Louise J. Gordy eds., 3d ed., 
2011). 
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bromyalgia, sometimes making a distinction very difficult.”
304
  For exam-
ple, hypothyroidism may cause fatigue and widespread soft tissue tender-
ness and thus can masquerade as fibromyalgia.
305
  An article on the differ-
ential diagnosis of fibromyalgia notes that 
[t]he multiple symptoms of fibromyalgia often overlap with those of re-
lated disorders and may further complicate the diagnosis. One of the 
most challenging diagnostic dilemmas that clinicians face is distin-
guishing fibromyalgia from other central pain disorders (e.g., irritable 
bowel syndrome, chronic fatigue syndrome, migraine) . . . .  To date, 
there is no “gold standard” for diagnosing fibromyalgia. Until a better 
clinical case definition of fibromyalgia exists, all diagnostic criteria 
should be interpreted with caution, considered rudimentary, and subject 
to modification.
306
  
Similarly, “[b]ecause there are usually no physical signs to definitively di-
agnose irritable bowel syndrome, diagnosis is often a process of elimina-
tion.”
307
  Differential diagnoses for IBS include ulcerative colitis, diverticu-
litis, and Crohn’s disease.
308
  In addition, celiac disease and lactose 
intolerance may cause signs and symptoms similar to IBS.
309
 
Thus, one could imagine a cause of action parallel to Wojton for FMS 
or IBS: (1) wrongful diagnosis of FMS or IBS, (2) wrongful prescribing of 
Lyrica or Zelnorm, (3) failure to diagnose, for example, hypothyroidism or 
Crohn’s disease, and (4) failure to prescribe drugs for these conditions.  A 
patient presenting with gastrointestinal complaints who self-diagnoses as 
having IBS and seeks a prescription for Zelnorm (based on the cumulative 
impact of a disease-mongering campaign), may in fact have a number of 
other diseases.  If the doctor fails to consider these differential diagnoses, 
fails to order appropriate tests, and thereby wrongfully diagnoses IBS, the 
doctor may be liable for malpractice if the patient suffers adverse reactions 
to Zelnorm. 
Medical malpractice lawsuits could be a weapon against disease-
branding and drug-mongering, but they only work in individual cases 
against individual doctors.  Although individual incidents may be remedied 
through medical malpractice cases, this would not produce systemic change 
 
 304 Id. at 25.37.  
 305 Id. 
 306 D.L. Goldenberg, Diagnosis and Differential Diagnosis of Fibromyalgia, 122 AM. J. 
MED. (12 Supp.) S14, S14 (2009). 
 307 Irritable Bowel Syndrome—Tests and Diagnoses, MAYO CLINIC (July 29, 2011), 
http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/irritable-bowel-syndrome/DS00106/DSECTION=tests-
and-diagnosis [hereinafter Irritable Bowel Syndrome—Tests and Diagnoses]. 
 308 3 ATTORNEYS’ DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE I-62839 (2009); see also Hans Tester, Ul-
cerative Colitis, in 16 ATTORNEYS’ TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE, supra note 303, at 231.50, 
231.54(3). 
 309 Irritable Bowel Syndrome–Tests and Diagnoses, supra note 307. 
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in pharmaceutical companies’ promotion of their products.  And while suc-
cessful medical malpractice claims create precedent for which other victims 
of disease-branding and drug-mongering could rely, this would probably 
only affect doctors’ diagnostic procedures rather than their prescribing hab-
its.  In other words, when patients complain of disease-branded symptoms, 
physicians would be more likely to consider differential diagnoses, rather 
than refuse to prescribe a drug and facilitate the drug-mongering.  Thus, 
any attempt to “starve the pharmaceutical beast” by suing doctors in an ef-
fort to prevent drug overprescribing would likely fail to address the institu-
tionalized practice of DTC advertising central to disease-branding and 
drug-mongering campaigns. 
Ultimately, it seems possible to file a complaint for IIED based on the 
alleged outrageousness of DTC advertising campaigns, and while the case 
may reach adjudication on the merits, it seems insufficient to significantly 
alter pharmaceutical promotional practices.  In addition, an NIED claim 
would probably fail due to the lack of contemporaneousness between emo-
tional distress and injury; also the learned intermediary doctrine would 
pose a formidable defense to an NIED case.  Finally, medical malpractice 
claims seem to be a viable, although still insufficient, option that could cir-
cuitously influence how pharmaceutical companies advertise.  Notwith-
standing the potential for establishing precedent, even if a test case is won 
and affirmed on appeal, these litigious retrospective strategies would ulti-
mately be ineffective at producing real, systemic change in disease-
branding and drug-mongering promotional practices.  Therefore, the critics 
of these practices should look to the legislative arena to combat the specific 
pharmaceutical promotional strategies that they consider particularly egre-
gious and detrimental to public health.  Legislative reform, as a prospective 
remedy, can address the practices on a comprehensive, collaborative, and 
systemic level, without resorting to the expensive, time-consuming, and 
highly-particularized adversarial process. 
C. Legislative Prescriptions for Reform: Understanding and 
Promoting “Academic Detailing” 
  Rather than relying on the inherently retrospective remedy of litiga-
tion, it is possible to construct prospective policy solutions.
310
  For exam-
 
 310 Cf. Lambdin, supra note 240, at 170–71.  
While it may ultimately be out of the hands of the courts and the FDA to im-
pose harsher restrictions on direct-to-consumer advertising, if the public con-
tinues to hear statements [warning how DTC marketing has led to irresponsi-
ble prescribing practices that jeopardize patient safety], it is highly likely that 
it will be able to initiate reform on its own, as the pendulum of public percep-
tion swings from one of acceptance to suspicion in the realm of direct-to-
consumer advertising. 
Id. 
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ple, educating doctors about drug-mongering and disease-branding, through 
a process called “academic detailing,” could curb the arguably detrimental 
effects of these advertising practices.
311
  Academic detailing is the process 
by which non-profit entities send trained healthcare professionals to physi-
cians’ offices to educate them about drugs and prescribing practices.
312
  Es-
sentially, qualified experts, “[u]sing some of the techniques of behavioral 
science that drug reps use, but without the financial incentives of gifts and 
samples,” train doctors about drug-treatment options and prescribing prac-
tices.
313
 
The most important techniques of academic detailing include “con-
ducting interviews to investigate baseline knowledge and motivations for 
current prescribing patterns . . . [and] establishing credibility through a re-
spected organizational identity, referencing authoritative and unbiased 
sources of information, and presenting both sides of controversial is-
sues.”
314
  Accordingly, academic detailing “combat[s] pharmaceutical sales 
reps[’] influence on prescribing, and help[s] get doctors the best evi-
dence—without the sales pitch.”
315
  Because DTC advertising gives con-
sumers increased access to information, academic detailing will allow doc-
tors to regain their medical authority by becoming knowledgeable about 
pharmaceutical promotional practices in an effort to combat the effects of 
DTC advertising on patients.
316
 
Doctors should be aware of disease-branding and drug-mongering.
317
  
They “should be wary of exaggerated claims and should place the same 
amount of scrutiny on ads for prescription drugs as [they] would on any 
 
 311 But see Iona Heath, Combating Disease Mongering: Daunting but Nonetheless Es-
sential, 3 PLOS MED. 448, 448 (2006), available at 
http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.0030146  
(“The challenges of combating the current epidemic of disease mongering is daunting, and 
anyone looking for ready solutions should read no further.”). 
 312 Susan Poser, Unlabeled Drug Samples and the Learned Intermediary: The Case for 
Drug Company Liability Without Preemption, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 653, 691–92 (2007); 
see also Academic Detailing and the Odds at Agincourt, POSTSCRIPT BLOG (Apr. 22, 2010, 
10:28 AM), http://postscript.communitycatalyst.org/?p=1254 [hereinafter Academic Detail-
ing and the Odds at Agincourt]. 
 313 Poser, supra note 312, at 692. 
 314 Stephen B. Soumerai & Jerry Avorn, Principles of Educational Outreach (‘Academic 
Detailing’) to Improve Clinical Decision Making, 263 JAMA 549, 549 (1990). 
 315 Kate Petersen, Academic Detailing Moves Ahead at the State, Federal Level, 
POSTSCRIPT BLOG (Feb. 25, 2010, 10:23 AM), 
http://postscript.communitycatalyst.org/?p=1150.  
 316 See Poser, supra note 312, at 692 (“The goal of academic detailing is to counteract 
the influence of drug reps, improve clinical decision making by physicians, and respond to 
pressure to minimize healthcare costs.”). 
 317 Shankar & Subish, supra note 105, at 278. 
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other advertisement.”
318
  Academic detailing would thus provide physicians 
with the tools to recognize drug-seeking behavior associated with disease-
branding and drug-mongering strategies.  By making doctors aware of the-
se promotional practices, and reiterating the importance of differential di-
agnoses and alternative treatment options, academic detailing would be an 
effective tool to combat these practices.  Moreover, open communication 
between physicians and patients, both with full knowledge of disease-
branding and drug-mongering practices, would expose the manipulative ef-
fects of these practices and allow for more rational prescription drug use.  
In fact, research suggests that academic detailing is an effective way to 
counteract the influence of pharmaceutical promotional practices and re-
duce inappropriate prescribing.
319
  For example, one study published in the 
New England Journal of Medicine concluded that “[a]cademically based 
‘detailing’ may represent a useful and cost-effective way to improve the 
quality of drug-therapy decisions and reduce unnecessary expenditures.”
320
   
Growing interest in academic detailing “is part of a growing aware-
ness that pharmaceutical marketing has the potential to interfere with safe 
prescribing and patient care—and a broader effort to make sure it 
doesn’t.”
321
  The problems associated with drug marketing have captured 
Congress’s attention and inspired it to act.  The Independent Drug Educa-
tion and Outreach Act (IDEA), a bill that was introduced in the House of 
Representatives and Senate but died in committee, would have provided 
“grants or contracts for prescription drug education and outreach for 
healthcare providers and their patients.”
322
  The relevant section of the act 
would have required the Secretary of Health and Human Services to award 
contracts to “eligible entities for the development and implementation of 
programs to appropriately train and deploy healthcare professionals to edu-
cate physicians and other drug prescribers concerning the relative safety, 
relative effectiveness, and relative cost of prescription drugs and their al-
ternatives.”
323
 
 
 318 Ishmeal Bradley, Talk to Your Doctor: Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescrip-
tion Drugs, Part 3, CLINICAL CORRELATIONS (Aug. 13, 2010, 11:30 AM), 
http://www.clinicalcorrelations.org/?p=2990.   
 319 See, e.g., Jerry Avorn & Stephen B. Soumerai, Improving Drug-Therapy Decisions 
through Educational Outreach—A Randomized Controlled Trial of Academically Based De-
tailing, 308 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1457 (1983); M.A. O’Brien et al., Educational Outreach Vis-
its: Effects on Professional Practice and Health Care Outcomes, COCHRANE DATABASE OF 
SYSTEMATIC REVS. No. CD000409 (1997); Soumerai & Avorn, supra note 314. 
 320 Avorn & Soumerai, supra note 319, at 1457. 
 321 Academic Detailing and the Odds at Agincourt, supra note 312. 
 322 Independent Drug Education and Outreach Act of 2009 (IDEA), S. 767, 111th Cong. 
(2009). 
 323 S.767 § 904(c). 
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The bill was premised on the notion that “[o]ffice calls work.  That’s 
why they are the preferred sales tactic of industry.  So it makes sense that 
governments and others who actually foot the cost of prescription drugs 
should adopt the same tactic, albeit with the goal of encouraging the use of 
the best, safest, most cost-effective drugs.”
324
  Therefore, IDEA should be 
reintroduced, and ultimately enacted into law, as a prospective remedy for 
the detrimental effects of disease-branding and drug-mongering.  The bill 
could be amended to also create advisory committees composed of sociol-
ogy, marketing, and psychology experts to help construct academic-
detailing protocols and public-health outreach programs.  These protocols 
and programs would facilitate the academic detailer’s role in explaining to 
doctors and patients the power of medicalization—how social forces im-
pact the definition of diseases, how disease is thus socially constructed, and 
how medicalization can be influenced by aggressive promotional practices.  
The advisory committee recommendations could clarify the sociology-of-
health critique of disease-branding and drug-mongering, and the increased 
knowledge of this phenomenon would yield a stronger defense arsenal for 
both prescribing physicians and patients. 
Ultimately, this legislative prescription would not alter the FDA’s 
regulatory authority over DTC advertising and would leave the FD&C Act 
and associated regulations intact,
325
 but would provide an alternative educa-
tional method of combating the deleterious effects of otherwise-legal ad-
vertising and promotional practices. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The problems of disease-branding and drug-mongering have become 
rampant in our society, though at this juncture it is uncontested that they do 
not, as a general matter, violate any existing laws.  These phenomena have 
surfaced as a result of relatively relaxed FDA regulation of DTC advertis-
ing.  Drug companies have recognized the utility of socially constructing 
diseases and have employed this technique into effective advertising prac-
tices.  It might be possible to bring a cause of action against drug compa-
nies and, somewhat derivatively, against prescribing physicians for these 
practices, but it seems that the most likely way to effect change in this area 
of law would be through legislation and education. 
The likelihood of success for an IIED claim is improbable, and an 
NIED claim would most likely fail for a variety of reasons including the 
lack of contemporaneousness with distress and injury and the learned in-
termediary doctrine defense.  Furthermore, while medical malpractice 
 
 324 The Next Big IDEA: Prescriber Education, POSTSCRIPT BLOG (July 31, 2008, 1:16 
PM), http://postscript.communitycatalyst.org/?p=179. 
 325 The bill would amend the Public Health Service Act only by adding additional sec-
tions.  See S. 767 § 2. 
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claims against prescribing physicians for wrongful diagnosis might be suc-
cessful on an individual basis, they would not bring about any substantial 
changes in drug-company advertising practices.  Thus, critics of disease-
branding and drug-mongering seem to be left without an effective legal 
remedy, and any such remedy would certainly not lead to, or result in, 
overhaul in a way that legislation could. 
Therefore, because the promotional practices are legal and generally 
do not rise to the level of tortious conduct, critics of disease-branding and 
drug-mongering ought to consider legislative reform efforts to address 
pharmaceutical promotional practices and ameliorate their public health ef-
fects.  Enhancing physicians and consumers’ knowledge would enable 
them to recognize disease-branding and drug-mongering and cope better 
with the torrent of such practices.  Instituting academic-detailing programs 
would combat these practices in a systemic and non-litigious way by coun-
teracting the effects of DTC advertising on consumer demand and physi-
cian prescribing habits. 
Although these promotional practices will probably never go away, it 
is certainly possible for the pharmaceutical industry, the FDA, and critics 
alike to coexist more harmoniously.  If these relevant stakeholders were 
aware of the existing competing economic and public-health goals, then 
educated doctors and consumers could select which drugs are medically 
necessary, rather than being persuaded by the industry’s disease-branding 
and drug-mongering practices. 
 
